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Our issue begins with the annual review of the past Term’s criminalcases from the United States Supreme Court. Professor Charles Weis-selberg of Berkeley Law presents this engaging review, this time joined
by two of his students, Daniel Chen and Sameera Mangena. This is now the
eighth straight year that Professor Weisselberg has provided this service to us.
His reviews of the cases emphasize aspects most likely to affect judges in state
courts, note emerging caselaw responses to the new decisions, and highlight
issues that the Court will address in the Term now in progress.
Our second article provides the views of two noted psychologists on issues
associated with Miranda warnings. I was surprised at the start to learn of the
great variation in the way warnings are given—one study identified more than
1,000 unique variations. Richard Rogers and Eric
Drogin then review ways in which a person’s
understanding of these warnings could be
improved. Judges regularly decide motions to
suppress evidence based on a claim that Miranda
warnings weren’t appropriately made or under-
stood. This article will help place those discus-
sions in a broader context.
Our third article presents a research study test-
ing the reaction of judges to different types of evi-
dence suggesting that a criminal defendant may
have been wrongly convicted. They surveyed 308
judges to determine the different weight judges
might place on forensic-science evidence of a
wrongful conviction as compared to social-science evidence. The researchers did
find that judges generally prefer forensic science over social science. They rec-
ommend greater judicial education, noting that judges tend to underestimate the
prevalence of some of the errors that lead to wrongful convictions. The article
also includes a quick overview of the leading causes of wrongful convictions:
eyewitness misidentification, errors in forensic-science testing, police miscon-
duct, undue weight given to expert testimony, and false confessions.
We also have two new features that first appeared in our last issue. Canadian
judge Wayne Gorman, a judge of the Provincial Court of Newfoundland and
Labrador, is now providing a regular column on aspects of Canadian law or prac-
tice that would be of general interest. In this issue, he talks about the expecta-
tions for the announcement of a decision by a Canadian judge in terms of pro-
viding reasons for the decision and how Canadian judges assess witness credi-
bility. Arkansas judge Vic Fleming, who has written crossword puzzles and legal
humor columns for many years, is providing a law-related crossword puzzle for
your enjoyment. 
Please let us know what you think of these new features—along with any
other suggestions you may have for articles or authors or subjects you’d like to
see. You can contact me (sleben56@gmail.com) or my coeditor, Eve Brank
(ebrank2@unl.edu). As always, thanks for reading Court Review.—SL 
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It is not the critic who counts; nor the one whopoints out how the strong person stumbled, orwhere the doer of a deed could have been better.
The credit belongs to the person who is actually in
the arena; . . . who strives valiantly; . . . who at the
best knows in the end the triumph of high achieve-
ment; and who at worst, if he or she fails, at least fails
while daring greatly.”—Theodore Roosevelt, The Man
in the Arena: Citizenship in a Republic.
I am humbled and thankful that our fellow AJA
members have elected me to be your “Man in the
Arena” this year.  In a sense, the minute we take
our oath of office as judges, all of us are immedi-
ately “in the arena” of public scrutiny.  Our motto
at AJA is “Making Better Judges®,” and we hope
that this year we can help you better withstand
that public scrutiny as we help each other shine
and sparkle while toiling in the “arena” of our
courtrooms and chambers.  Many times our decisions require
great courage, other times we are required to exercise great
patience; sometimes compassion is called for, and at other
times, we must stand firm.  But at all times, we must treat all
who appear in the judicial “arena” with fairness and dignity to
better serve the ends of justice. 
To that end, former AJA presidents Kevin Burke and Steve
Leben have been working for years to promote the concept of
“Procedural Fairness.”  Both have written great articles in this
and other publications, and have presented at many judicial
conferences in the United States and Canada, explaining those
concepts to all in attendance.  This year Kevin and Steve were
joined by my immediate predecessor as AJA president, Brian
MacKenzie, as together they presented a unique perspective on
“Procedural Fairness and Drug Treatment Courts” at our Seat-
tle conference.
We were especially fortunate to have partnered with the
Washington State Judiciary and the National Association of
State Judicial Educators (NASJE) in Seattle.  Special thanks to
our Washington judges and AJA officers, Catherine Shaffer and
Richard Kayne, who worked closely with colleagues from the
Washington judiciary and NASJE to present one of our best
education programs ever!  Special thanks to the State Justice
Institute for a grant used to help defray our costs.  
We cannot all attend our national conferences, where we can
receive inspiring instruction from colleagues like Kevin, Steve,
and Brian, hear dynamic speakers such as Nicole Austin-
Hillery, or sit in awe as Dean Erwin Chemerinsky presents his
superb annual review of recent developments
from the United States Supreme Court.  For
those who cannot attend our conferences, mem-
bership in AJA still comes with special advan-
tages.  We have the ability through our AJA web-
site to access the many wonderful articles and
materials presented at our conferences.  We all
have the ability to network through our elec-
tronic offerings. We can still reap the benefits of
the knowledge of our colleagues’ “Best Practices”
and learn more about the issues of concern to all of us through
Court Review, our quarterly publication sent to all AJA mem-
bers.
Periodically, you will also receive an e-mail publication we
call “The Rundown.”  As your president, I hope to keep you
informed of all of our activities conducted on your behalf
throughout the year.  We at AJA want to be there for you as
together we work at Making Better Judges®.
Please make a special effort to join us at our midyear con-
ference scheduled in Santa Fe, New Mexico, from April 19-22,
2016.  Come with us to Toronto September 25-30, 2016, as we
join our Canadian counterparts at what promises to be another
great annual conference!   Our president-elect, Judge Russell
Otter from Toronto, promises that you will not leave disap-
pointed.  
Join us in the worthy cause of Making Better Judges® as we
toil together in the judicial arena!  Together, let us help each
other achieve the triumph of high achievement by becoming
better judges.                  
President’s Column
John Conery
Footnotes
1. See R. v. R.E.M., [2008] 3 S.C.R. 3, ¶ 8 (Can.).
2. R. v. Burns, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 656, ¶ 18 (Can.) (citations omitted).
3. [2002] 1 S.C.R. 869 (Can.).
4. See R. v. Gagnon, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 621, ¶ 12 (Can.). 
5. See R. v. Wolynec, 2015 ONCA 656, 2015 CarswellOnt 14700, 
¶ 54 (Can. Ont.). 
6. Sheppard, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 869, ¶ 33.
7. Id. ¶ 55. The entirety of the trial judge’s reasons consisted of the
following statement (at paragraph 2): “Having considered all the
testimony in this case, and reminding myself of the burden on
the Crown and the credibility of witnesses, and how this is to be
assessed, I find the defendant guilty as charged.”
8. See, e.g., R. v. Szabo, 2002 BCSC 635 (Can. B.C.); R. v. Wojcik,
2002 MBCA 82 (Can. Man.); R. v. Edgett, 2002 NBQB 205 (Can.
N.B.); R. v. Garbauski, 2003 BCSC 487 (Can. B.C); R. v. P.J.C.,
2003 BCCA 332 (Can. B.C.); R. v. Hamstra, 2004 ABQB 156 (Can.
Alta.); R. v. Gray, 2007 NBQB 364 (Can. N.B.). 
In my first column I chose a very specific topic (recusal onthe basis of reasonable apprehension of bias) that easilyflowed over our shared border. In this column, I intend to
significantly broaden the analysis. 
Here I will examine what I describe as an evolution (or rev-
olution) that is occurring in the manner in which Canadian
trial judges render judgment and how they are reviewed on
appeal. Interestingly, this evolution is entirely free of any statu-
tory basis. I hope it will provide American judges some insight
into what is expected of their Canadian counterparts and cause
them to consider how the Canadian experience relates to their
own work and standards. 
THE SCOPE OF THE ANALYSIS
A column does not provide space for a review of an entire
judicial system. So I intend to look at two changes that high-
light how Canadian judging is evolving, under the following
headings:
1. the requirement for reasons; and
2. the potential death of demeanour as a basis for the
assessment of the credibility of witnesses. 
Let us start with the requirement for reasons.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
The provision of reasons by Canadian trial judges had tra-
ditionally been a source of little appellate court comment
because there was no such requirement at common law.1 For
instance, in 1994, the Supreme Court of Canada indicated in
R. v. Burns that a judge is “not required” to give reasons: 
Failure to indicate expressly that all relevant considera-
tions have been taken into account in arriving at a ver-
dict is not a basis for allowing an appeal . . . . This
accords with the general rule that a trial judge does not
err merely because he or she does not give reasons for
deciding one way or the other on problematic points.
The judge is not required to demonstrate that he or she
knows the law and has considered all aspects of the evi-
dence. Nor is the judge required to explain why he or
she does not entertain a reasonable doubt as to the
accused’s guilt. Failure to do any of these things does
not, in itself, permit a court of appeal to set aside the ver-
dict.2
Eight years later in R. v. Sheppard,3 a dramatic change
occurred. The Supreme Court of Canada would subsequently
say that its “approach to [the] question ha[d] evolved.”4
In Sheppard, the Supreme Court of Canada set aside a con-
viction on the basis that the trial judge’s reasons were insuffi-
cient. In doing so, the Court created what has been described
as a “freestanding error of law” justifying the setting aside of a
verdict solely on the basis of “inadequacy of reasons.”5 The
Supreme Court of Canada held in Sheppard that trial judges are
required “to state more than the result.”6 The Supreme Court
created the following common-law test for appellate determi-
nation as to whether a trial judge’s reasons are sufficient:
The trial judge’s duty is satisfied by reasons which are
sufficient to serve the purpose for which the duty is
imposed, i.e., a decision which, having regard to the par-
ticular circumstances of the case, is reasonably intelligi-
ble to the parties and provides the basis for meaningful
appellate review of the correctness of the trial judge’s
decision.7
This appears both simple and revolutionary in comparison
to Burns. Accordingly, after Sheppard, the issue of the adequacy
of trial judges’ reasons became a matter of significant appellate
consideration in Canada. Such questions as when will a judge’s
reasons be sufficient; what must reasons contain; and how
much or how little is required, were subjects of appellate
debate. The overturning of convictions on the basis of insuffi-
cient reasons was no longer uncommon.8
The issue became such a common basis for appellate inter-
vention in Canada that the Supreme Court granted leave to
appeal in a number of cases involving the adequacy of the trial
judges’ reasons. The results of these appeals have helped to
clarify the governing standards, but they also appear to consti-
tute a series of significant steps back from the bold initiative
the Supreme Court of Canada set out in Sheppard. Let me
explain. 
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9. [2006] 1 S.C.R. 621 (Can.). 
10. Id. ¶ 20. 
11. [2008] 3 S.C.R. 3 (Can.).
12. Id. ¶ 6.
13. Id. ¶ 10 (emphasis added).
14. Id. ¶ 14.
15. Id. ¶ 66.
16. [2008] 1 S.C.R. 788, ¶ 23 (Can.).
17. R.E.M., [2008] 3 S.C.R. 3, ¶ 49.
18. Id. ¶ 43. In a somewhat amusing context, the Court of Appeal chas-
tised the trial judge in the case of M. v. M. for rendering judgment
through the use of a “post-it note.” 2011 NLCA 57 (Can. Nfld.).
19. 2012 ONCA 636, 2012 CarswellOnt 11924 (Can. Ont.).
20. Id. ¶ 16.
The next appeal to reach the Supreme Court of Canada on
the issue of sufficiency of reasons was R. v. Gagnon.9 In Gagnon,
the Quebec Court of Appeal, relying on Sheppard, had set aside
a conviction on the basis that the trial judge’s reasons insuffi-
ciently dealt with credibility issues. The Supreme Court of
Canada, in reinstating the conviction, indicated that appellate
review of a trial judge’s reasons for assessing credibility must
be undertaken with the understanding that it can be “very dif-
ficult for a trial judge to articulate with precision the complex
intermingling of impressions that emerge after watching and
listening to witnesses and attempting to reconcile the various
versions of events.”10 Thus, reasons for credibility determina-
tions are not necessary, and appellate review should concen-
trate on whether there was a basis for the trial judge’s conclu-
sion. 
Similarly, in R. v. R.E.M.,11 the Supreme Court of Canada
reversed the British Columbia Court of Appeal’s decision to
overturn a number of sexual-assault convictions on the
grounds of inadequate reasons, in particular as regards the trial
judge’s failure to sufficiently refer to the accused’s evidence.
The Supreme Court did so despite noting that the trial judge in
convicting the accused “did not clearly explain which of the
offences were proved by . . . [the] evidence [that] had been
led.”12
Interestingly, the Supreme Court of Canada commenced its
analysis in R.E.M. by declaring “that ‘it is now appropriate to
recognize that, in certain circumstances, the duty of procedural
fairness will require the provision of a written explanation for
a decision’. A criminal trial, where the accused’s innocence is
at stake, is one such circumstance.”13 The Court then stated:
In summary, the law has progressed to the point where
it may now be said with confidence that a trial judge on
a criminal trial where the accused’s innocence is at stake
has a duty to give reasons.14
However, the Court upheld the convictions, despite the fail-
ure of the trial judge to explain why he disbelieved the
accused’s evidence, on the basis that such an explanation was
not required:
[T]he trial judge’s failure to explain why he rejected the
accused’s plausible denial of the charges provides no
ground for finding the reasons deficient. The trial judge’s
reasons made it clear that in general, where the com-
plainant’s evidence and the accused’s evidence con-
flicted, he accepted the evidence of the complainant.
This explains why he rejected the accused’s denial. He
gave reasons for accepting the complainant’s evidence,
finding her generally truthful and “a very credible wit-
ness”, and concluding that her testimony on specific
events was “not seriously challenged” (para. 68). It fol-
lowed of necessity that he rejected the accused’s evidence
where it conflicted with evidence of the complainant
that he accepted. No further explanation for rejecting the
accused’s evidence was required.15
In R. v. Dinardo, the Supreme Court of Canada indicated that
in “a case that turns on credibility, such as this one, the trial
judge must direct his or her mind to the decisive question of
whether the accused’s evidence, considered in the context of
the evidence as a whole, raises a reasonable doubt as to his
guilt.”16 However, in R.E.M. (decided after Dinardo), the Court
said that trial judges may wish to “spare” an accused person
they are convicting from “unflattering” comments concerning
his or her credibility:
While it is useful for a judge to attempt to articulate the
reasons for believing a witness and disbelieving another
in general or on a particular point, the fact remains that
the exercise may not be purely intellectual and may
involve factors that are difficult to verbalize. Further-
more, embellishing why a particular witness’s evidence
is rejected may involve the judge saying unflattering
things about the witness; judges may wish to spare the
accused who takes the stand to deny the crime, for
example, the indignity of not only rejecting his evidence
and convicting him, but adding negative comments
about his demeanor. In short, assessing credibility is a
difficult and delicate matter that does not always lend
itself to precise and complete verbalization.17
WHAT IS REQUIRED OF CANADIAN JUDGES? 
In R.E.M., the Supreme Court answered this question by
stating that “what is required is that the reasons, read in the
context of the record and the submissions on the live issues in
the case, show that the judge has seized the substance of the
matter. Provided this is done, detailed recitations of evidence
or the law are not required.”18
Despite these comments, Canadian appellate courts contin-
ued to set aside convictions because of insufficient reasons. In
R. v. Clouthier,19 for instance, the Ontario Court of Appeal set
aside a conviction for robbery because the trial judge failed to
deal with certain portions of the evidence in convicting the
accused. The court indicated that
while trial judges are not required to make reference to
every piece of evidence, there is a duty to consider the
evidence in its entirety, not simply the evidence that
inculpates the accused. In my view, the failure to deal
with two items that tended to exculpate the appellant—
the balaclava and the evidence as to the height of the
robber—amounts to an error of law sufficient to justify
setting aside these convictions.20
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21. 2012 ABCA 119, 2012 CarswellAlta 708, ¶ 25 (Can. Alta.).
22. [2013] 2 S.C.R. 639 (Can.).
23. Id. ¶ 4. The trial judge in Vuradin simply stated: “In the end,
notwithstanding [the appellant’s] denial, I have no reasonable
doubt that the [appellant] did commit the acts which [the com-
plainant] described.” Id. ¶ 6.
24. Id. ¶ 13 (citing R.E.M.).
25. 2014 BCCA 184, 2014 CarswellBC 1339, ¶ 32 (Can. B.C.).
26. [2013] 2 S.C.R. 357 (Can.).
27. Id. ¶ 1.
28. Id. ¶ 33.
29. Id. ¶ 31. For a critical review of this decision, see Alain Roussy,
Cut-and-Paste Justice: A Case Comment on Cojocaru v. British
Columbia Women’s Hospital and Health Centre, 52 ALTA. L. REV. 761
(2015).
30. 2014 ONCA 77, 2014 CarswellOnt 871, ¶ 5 (Can. Ont.).
31. 2015 SKCA 32, 2015 CarswellSask 188, ¶¶ 31, 35-42 (Can. Sask.).
32. R. v. Szabo, 2002 BCSC 635, 2002 CarswellBC 3723, ¶ 35 (Can.
B.C.).  
33. 2015 NBCA 61, 2015 CarswellNB 437, ¶ 11 (Can. N.B.).
Similarly, in R. v. M.J.E.B.,21 the Alberta Court of Appeal
held that “where there is conflicting evidence on a key issue,
and the contradiction must be resolved by an assessment of
credibility, there is an obligation on a trial judge to explain
how he has resolved those contradictions in assessing reason-
able doubt.” As we will see, the Supreme Court of Canada
would reject this proposition a year later. 
Eleven years after Sheppard, the Supreme Court of Canada
returned to the sufficiency of reasons yet again, this time in the
case of R. v. Vuradin.22
In Vuradin, the accused was convicted of a number of sex-
ual offenses. The Supreme Court of Canada described the trial
judge’s reasons as “sparse” and “not directly” addressing the
accused’s evidence.23 However, the convictions were affirmed. 
The Supreme Court of Canada indicated that it found the
trial judge’s “sparse” reasons sufficient because
a trial judge’s failure to explain why he rejected an
accused’s plausible denial of the charges does not mean
the reasons are deficient as long as the reasons generally
demonstrate that, where the complainant’s evidence and
the accused’s evidence conflicted, the trial judge
accepted the complainant’s evidence. No further expla-
nation for rejecting the accused’s evidence is required as
the convictions themselves raise a reasonable inference
that the accused’s denial failed to raise a reasonable
doubt.24
Thus, it appears that when the evidence of a complainant
and the accused conflict, a Canadian trial judge is not required
to explain why he or she rejected the testimony provided by
the accused if the judge’s reasons demonstrate that where the
complainant’s evidence and the accused’s evidence conflicted,
the trial judge accepted the complainant’s evidence. In R. v.
R.J.C.,25 the British Columbia Court of Appeal stated that the
accused was “entitled to know why his evidence was rejected.”
However, this comment simply cannot be reconciled with the
Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Vuradin.
Finally, though not a decision concerning the sufficiency of
reasons, the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Cojocaru v.
British Columbia Women’s Hospital and Health26 is a further
illustration of how the Court has diminished what it had
described as a “duty to give reasons.” 
In Cojocaru, the trial judge, in rendering judgment, repro-
duced in his reasons large portions of the written submission
of the plaintiffs’ counsel—321 paragraphs of the 368 were
copied from the plaintiffs’ written submission.  
The Supreme Court of Canada said:
[W]hile it is desirable that judges express their conclu-
sions in their own words, incorporating substantial
amounts of material from submissions or other legal
sources into reasons for judgment does not without
more permit the decision to be set aside. Only if the
incorporation is such that a reasonable person would
conclude that the judge did not put her mind to the
issues and decide them independently and impartially as
she was sworn to do, can the judgment be set aside.27
As to the judicial role and judgment writing, the Supreme
Court  declared that the “scope for judicial creativity is narrow,
but not non-existent.”28 The Court also indicated, somewhat
unkindly in my view, that “lack of originality alone [is not] a
flaw in judgment-writing; on the contrary, it is part and parcel
of the judicial process.”29
WHERE ARE WE NOW IN CANADA?
The debate over sufficiency of reasons has not ended. For
instance, in R. v. Labelle,30 the Ontario Court of Appeal set
aside a conviction because the trial judge failed to give “an
explanation of why” he did not have a reasonable doubt on the
basis of contradictions in the complainant’s evidence. Similarly,
in R. v. Kennedy, the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal, in setting
aside a conviction, referred to the trial judge having failed to
comment upon the “credibility” of the Crown’s main witness,
though the trial judge had made several comments upon the
“weight” of this witness’ evidence.31 This seems a rather weak
distinction. 
Shortly after Sheppard, one appellate court judge suggested
that the decision represented “a significant change in the law
with respect to a trial judge’s duty to give reasons.”32 However,
as we have seen, this did not turn out to be true. This is illus-
trated by the decision of the New Brunswick Court of Appeal
in R. v. Crowley, in which the court held that a “successful
appeal from a verdict in a judge alone trial on the grounds
there were insufficient reasons, or the trial judge did not apply
the burden of proof, should be ‘rare.’”33
CONCLUSION (REASONS)
So, what can Canadian judges conclude from all of this?
What lessons should American judges take from the Canadian
experience? 
It is clear that reasons are required in a wide range of situa-
tions and that in providing reasons Canadian judges must
illustrate that they have seized the substance of the matter
before them; their reasons must be intelligible, allowing for
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34. In R. v. Williamson, for instance, the Manitoba Court of Appeal
held that though the “trial judge’s oral reasons are, at times, diffi-
cult to follow and are not well organized. . . . when they are read
in conjunction with the record of the evidence and the submis-
sions of counsel, the foundations of the trial judge’s decision are
clearly discernible.” 2015 MBCA 16, 2015 CarswellMan 41, ¶ 10
(Can. Man.). 
35. One author has noted that only a written judgment exposes “the
court’s decision to public scrutiny . . . . In no other way can it be
known whether the law needs revision; whether the court is doing
its job, whether a particular judge is competent.” George Smith, A
Primer of Opinion Writing, For Four New Judges, 21 ARK. L. REV.
197, 200-01 (1967). See also Judge Richard A. Posner, Judges Writ-
ing Styles (and Do They Matter?), 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1421, 1448
(1995) (suggesting that “the judge, by not writing, will be spared
a painful confrontation with the inadequacy of the reasoning that
supports his decision”). Nothing “better exposes any fallacies in
your ideas than reading them in cold type.” J.O. WILSON, A BOOK
FOR JUDGES 80 (1980).
36. The Ontario Court of Appeal has noted that “the Supreme Court
of Canada has repeatedly said, a reasoned acceptance of a com-
plainant’s evidence is a basis by itself for rejecting an accused’s evi-
dence.” R. v. J.C., 2013 ONCA 495, 2013 CarswellOnt 10029, ¶ 7
(Can. Ont.). Similarly, the Alberta Court of Appeal, in R. v. C.E.,
noted that a trial judge’s “failure to specifically advert to, or
explain why an accused’s plausible denial did not raise a reason-
able doubt is not fatal to a conviction.” 2014 ABCA 321, 2014
CarswellAlta 1756, ¶ 10 (Can. Alta.).
37. In R. v. Zinck, the Supreme Court of Canada stated: “Deficiencies
in reasons may sometimes require quashing an order for the sake
of the perceived fairness and the transparency of the criminal
process.” [2003] 1 S.C.R. 41, ¶ 37 (Can.).
38. [2013] UKPC 14, ¶ 15 (appeal taken from Berm.).
39. See, e.g., R. v. Lifchus, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 320, ¶ 29 (Can.). See also
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970).
40. See R. v. Gray, 2012 ABCA 51, 2012 CarswellAlta 223, ¶ 23 (Can.
Alta.).
41. See R. v. Ceal, 2012 BCCA 19, 2012 CarswellBC 80, ¶ 47 (Can.
B.C.).
42. [2012] 3 S.C.R. 726, ¶ 25 (Can.) (concerning a witness who
wished to wear a niqab that covered her face except for her eyes
while testifying).
43. 2015 ONCA 377, 2015 CarswellOnt 7586 (Can.). 
44. Id. ¶ 64.
45. Id. ¶ 85 (citations omitted).
appellate review of the reasoning process utilized. Having said
this, the standard required for reasons to be deemed sufficient
has been set at a very low level in Canada despite what
appeared to be a dramatic change after Sheppard.34 It is also
clear, despite the brief reference in R.E.M., that written reasons
are not required. This does not mean that written reasons do
not play an invaluable role in the administration of justice or
that judges should not be encouraged to write often, but that
is different from a requirement to write.35
It appears that when the evidence of a complainant and
the accused conflict, a Canadian judge is not required to
explain why he or she rejected the testimony provided by the
accused (even if “plausible”) if the judge’s reasons demon-
strate that where the complainant’s evidence and the
accused’s evidence conflicted, the trial judge accepted the
complainant’s evidence.36
This, of course, does not mean that a Canadian trial judge is
prohibited from explaining his or her reasons for rejecting a
“plausible” explanation provided by an accused person, and
there is great benefit to the administration of justice in judges
doing so, particularly in writing. A written judgment can add
significantly to a litigant’s perception of fairness.37 The impor-
tance of procedural fairness should not be underestimated. In
Laing v. R., the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council noted
(in the context of what reasons are required by appellate courts)
that the “guiding principle is one of fairness. The appellant is
entitled to be assured that his case has been properly considered
and to know why his appeal did not succeed.”38
I think a trial judge should have great difficulty, where an
accused person testifies at a trial and denies having committed
the offence, in rejecting his or her testimony without explain-
ing why.
Having considered the evolution of reasons for judgment in
Canada, let us now consider some recent Canadian develop-
ments in the use of a witness’ demeanour to assess credibility.
DEMEANOUR
In Canada, demeanour has traditionally been seen as having
an “intangible effect” on determining credibility.39 How does
the witness look while testifying? Do they make eye contact?
Are they nervous? What is their demeanour while testifying?40
These questions and consideration of such factors as “‘the tone
of [the witness’] voice, the look on his face, and any hesitation
he had in answering the questions’”41 have historically been
seen as important considerations for Canadian trial judges in
assessing credibility. In R. v. N.S., the Supreme Court of Canada
stated that it “is a settled axiom of appellate review that defer-
ence should be shown to the trier of fact on issues of credibil-
ity because trial judges (and juries) have the ‘overwhelming
advantage of seeing and hearing the witness—an advantage that
a written transcript cannot replicate.’”42 But we may be moving
away from such an approach in Canada. A recent example is the
Ontario Court of Appeal’s decision in R. v. Rhayel.43
THE CASES
In Rhayel, the accused was convicted of sexual assault. The
charge alleged that the accused retained the services of the com-
plainant, a sex worker, and sexually assaulted her when she
refused to have sexual intercourse with him without a condom.
The accused appealed from conviction, contending that the
trial judge erred by “overly relying on the complainant’s
demeanour in assessing her credibility.”44
The Ontario Court of Appeal suggested that there is 
a growing understanding of the fallibility of evaluating
credibility based on the demeanour of witnesses. It is
now acknowledged that demeanour is of limited value
because it can be affected by many factors including the
culture of the witness, stereotypical attitudes, and the
artificiality of and pressures associated with a court-
room. One of the dangers is that sincerity can be and
often is misinterpreted as indicating truthfulness.45
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In Bulsey, the Court of Appeal held that if a trial judge’s finding of
credibility is “contrary to compelling inferences,” it can be
reversed even “giving full weight to the advantage of the trial
judge in seeing and hearing the evidence unfold at the trial.” Id. 
¶ 71. Interestingly, this decision also involved the following
ground of appeal: “Appeal ground 1 contends that the trial judge’s
delay in giving judgment with reasons prejudiced the appellants’
case ‘in that the delay was detrimental to the quality of recall by
His Honour of the actual testimony of witnesses and the attendant
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The Court of Appeal indicated that “it is important for trial
judges to bear in mind that, to the extent possible, they should
try to decide cases that require assessing credibility without
undue reliance on such fallible considerations as demeanour
evidence.”46
The Court of Appeal concluded:
[T]he trial judge took an overly confident view of his
ability to assess the complainant’s credibility by refer-
ence to her demeanour. This reliance is particularly trou-
bling in the circumstances of this case because the
demeanour assessment was based on evidence that was
not subjected to contemporaneous cross-examination,
further weakening any possible value it had in assisting
the trial judge evaluate the complainant’s credibility.
In many cases, this error may not be of great moment.
But here, it mattered. Combined with the error of admit-
ting the videotaped statement for the truth of its con-
tents, this error provided the backdrop against which the
trial judge gauged the complainant’s and the appellant’s
account of what transpired when they engaged in sexual
activity in the car.47
Similar comments were made in a recent decision of the
New Zealand Court of Appeal. In R. v. Taniwha,48 the accused
was convicted of rape after a trial by judge and jury. On appeal,
he argued that the trial judge erred in failing “to give a tailored
direction relating to the evidential significance” of the com-
plainant’s “demeanour in the witness box.” The accused sug-
gested that there exists a “developed consensus as to the
importance of juries not placing undue significance on the
demeanour of a witness when assessing their reliability and
credibility.”49
The New Zealand Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.
The Court of Appeal explained that “the risk is not so much
placing reliance on demeanour evidence per se. Rather, the real
risk arises through considering demeanour evidence in isola-
tion from other evidence and relevant factors.”50 However, the
Court of Appeal also agreed “that in light of the known poten-
tial for misinterpretation of visual or oral cues given by a wit-
ness, some modification is appropriate to the more traditional
jury directions on demeanour.”51 It recommended that juries
should be directed to consider the demeanour of a witness as a
“valuable aid” in assessing whether a witness is credible. Inter-
estingly, the court suggested that in a “she said/he said” type of
case, demeanour “may assume greater importance in the
absence of other factors such as inconsistency or any inherent
implausibility.”52
However, despite the strong language used in Rhayel,
reliance on demeanour in assessing credibility of witnesses is
far from dead in Canada. For instance, in the recent decision
of R. v. Crowley, the New Brunswick Court of Appeal indicated
that “deference is owed to a trial judge’s assessment of the evi-
dence, as they are in a ‘unique’ position to see and hear wit-
nesses.”53 Interestingly, two of the reasons provided by the trial
judge in Crowley for rejecting the accused’s evidence was that
he appeared “stressed” during his testimony and kept his
replies to a “bare minimum.”54 This hardly seems a basis for
disbelieving a person’s evidence.55
In R. v. B.G.G.,56 the Manitoba Court of Appeal made simi-
lar comments on the role of demeanor in assessing the credi-
bility of a witness. Their comments may be considered by some
as a reflection of an outdated approach:
This case is one wherein, as the judge correctly noted,
credibility is the core issue. In dealing with cases of this
kind, the trial judge is required to closely consider and
review the testimony given by the witnesses. That exer-
cise includes not only the evidence given, but his/her
observation of the conduct and demeanor of the wit-
nesses as they testify. Thus, the trial judge is in a much
preferred position to that of appellate judges in making
credibility findings. For this reason, demeanor conclu-
sions are virtually unassailable on appellate review, and
deference is owed to trial judges in respect of findings of
fact, even more so findings of credibility, and the draw-
ing of inferences based thereon.57
Interestingly, the Canadian Judicial Council in its model
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jury instructions (which are referred to in Taniwha) recom-
mends an approach that combines the nebulous reference to
“the witness’s manner” with a caution not to make it the “most
important factor” in assessing credibility:
What was the witness’s manner when he or she testified?
Do not jump to conclusions, however, based entirely on
how a witness has testified. Looks can be deceiving. Giv-
ing evidence in a trial is not a common experience for
many witnesses. People react and appear differently.
Witnesses come from different backgrounds. They have
different abilities, values and life experiences. There are
simply too many variables to make the manner in which
a witness testifies the only or most important factor in
your decision.58
CONCLUSION (DEMEANOUR)
So, what can Canadian trial judges learn from these deci-
sions, and what lessons can American judges take from them? 
Foremost, in my view, is that the days of Canadian trial
judges placing significant reliance on the demeanour of a wit-
ness in determining credibility may be over. A compelling
argument can be made that findings of credibility should be
made based on logic, rationality, and most importantly, the
quality of the evidence presented. Trial judges have experience,
but we do not have any magical powers or crystal balls to look
into the hearts of witnesses to determine if they are being
truthful. Thus, reliance on evidence, confirmation, and cor-
roboration may encapsulate a new approach to judging. The
dangers of relying on our impressions of witnesses’ demeanour
in the witness box to determine their truthfulness may (and
some would argue should) be coming to an end.
CONCLUSION
Obviously, judging is a role subject to significant changes as
the law unfolds. The Canadian experience in reasons and
demeanour suggest that that what is expected of a judge is
always evolving. Canadian judges will have to grapple with
these two issues for some time to come. 
Though presented separately, the issues of reasons for judg-
ment and the role demeanour plays in assessing credibility are
subtly intertwined. If reasons for conviction do not require an
explanation for the rejection of an accused person’s “plausible”
denial of wrongdoing, then no one will know if the trial judge
placed too much reliance on demeanour. As pointed out by the
Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v. T.M.,59 reliance on demeanour
can lead to a trial judge drawing “inferences about a witness’s
credibility from the witness’s demeanour while that witness is
testifying . . . . even though the witness is not given an oppor-
tunity to explain any particular mannerisms while testifying.”
This would appear contrary to the essential nature of proce-
dural fairness. 
Hopefully for American judges, this column will be useful
in not only explaining the Canadian context, but in consider-
ing your own role as judges. 
Wayne Gorman is a judge of the Provincial
Court of Newfoundland and Labrador. His
blog (Keeping Up is Hard to Do: A Trial
Judge’s Reading Blog) can be found on the web
page of the Canadian Association of Provincial
Court Judges. He also writes a regular col-
umn (Of Particular Interest to Provincial
Court Judges) for the Canadian Provincial
Judges’ Journal. Judge Gorman’s work has been widely pub-
lished. His latest article is Ours Is to Reason Why: The Law of
Rendering Judgment, 62 Criminal Law Quarterly 301 (2015).
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wgorman@provincial.court.nl.ca. For United States judges who
may want to read in full one of the Canadian decisions referred to
here, you can contact Judge Gorman and he will forward a copy to
you by email. 
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1. 135 S. Ct. 1609 (2015).
2. Id. at 1612.
3. Id. at 1612-14.
4. Id. at 1614 (citing Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005)).
5. Id. at 1615.
6. Id. at 1615 (quoting Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 40-41
(2000)).
7. Id. at 1614.
8. Id. at 1617, 1618-20 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
9. Id. at 1622; see also id. at 1623 (Alito, J., dissenting).
10. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014) (asking whether
application of the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine to cell phones
“would ‘untether the rule from the justifications underlying’” the
warrant exception (quoting Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 343
(2009)).
Despite its relatively modest size, last Term’s SupremeCourt criminal docket packed a punch. The Courtdecided search-and-seizure issues important to day-to-
day policing, it returned to the Crawford v. Washington line of
cases, and several justices opined on the constitutionality of
solitary confinement and the death penalty. This article reviews
these and other criminal decisions with an eye toward issues
most relevant to state courts. It closes with a brief glance
toward the 2015 Term.
FOURTH AMENDMENT
Traffic stops and administrative searches were the focus of
this Term’s Fourth Amendment cases. The Court issued impor-
tant rulings on “add-ons” to legitimate police stops, the rea-
sonableness of searches and seizures made pursuant to an offi-
cer’s mistake of law, and the constitutionality of city ordinances
permitting the police to inspect hotel registries without prior
permission from a judge.
TRAFFIC STOPS
Rodriguez v. United States1 is a simple but important case,
with significant implications for day-to-day policing. Rejecting
a “de minimis” add-on to a traffic stop to search for drugs, the
justices held that “a police stop exceeding the time needed to
handle the matter for which the stop was made violates the
Constitution’s shield against unreasonable seizures.”2
An officer stopped Rodriguez for a traffic infraction. After
checking his license and registration and conducting a brief
conversation, the officer issued a warning ticket. The officer
then asked for permission to walk his narcotics-detection dog
around the vehicle, but Rodriguez refused. The defendant
was held for another seven or eight minutes until another
officer arrived and the dog alerted to the presence of drugs in
the vehicle. A search turned up methamphetamine. The court
of appeals upheld the search, ruling that the delay was a de
minimis intrusion on the defendant’s liberty.3 The Court
reversed.
Writing for six justices, Justice Ginsburg stated the basic
principle that “[l]ike a Terry stop, the tolerable duration of
police inquiries in the traffic-stop context is determined by the
seizure’s ‘mission’—to address the traffic violation that war-
ranted the stop . . . and to attend to related safety concerns.”4
The Fourth Amendment may permit “certain unrelated checks
during an otherwise lawful traffic stop,” but these may not pro-
long the stop “absent the reasonable suspicion ordinarily
demanded to justify detaining an individual.”5 A dog sniff is
“aimed at ‘detect[ing] evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdo-
ing.’”6 Since it is not ordinarily part of a traffic stop, even a de
minimis increase in the length of detention to facilitate a dog
sniff is unlawful. The permissible duration of a traffic stop has
come to an end “when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are—
or reasonably should have been—completed.”7 The majority
remanded for the court of appeals to determine if the officer
had reasonable suspicion to detain Rodriguez beyond the traf-
fic-stop investigation. 
Justice Thomas, joined by Justices Alito and Kennedy, dis-
sented, finding that the overall length of the stop was rea-
sonable.  They also argued that the majority’s test will pro-
duce arbitrary results, as a rookie officer might reasonably
take longer to complete a traffic-stop investigation than a sea-
soned officer and that it will be difficult to determine which
activities are permissibly related to the objectives of a traffic
stop.8 Two of the dissenters also would have ruled that the
detention pending the dog sniff was justified by reasonable
suspicion.9
A few points are important to note, and it will be interest-
ing to see their treatment in the state courts and the lower fed-
eral courts. First, just as in Riley v. California (the recent cell-
phone-search blockbuster), the Court has again tightly “teth-
ered” the scope of a warrantless search or seizure to the pur-
poses for it.10 Here, even a de minimis prolongation of deten-
tion is not reasonable since it does not serve the purpose for
the stop. Second, the justices determined that the permissible
length of a stop may vary depending on the circumstances and
the purpose of the stop. The Court rejected a bright-line rule
proposed by Rodriguez, who had suggested that it was unrea-
sonable to hold him beyond the point where the officer actu-
ally issued the ticket warning.  A large part of the petitioner’s
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oral argument was consumed with whether such a bright line
would be workable or whether officers would simply delay
issuing a warning until after a dog sniff.11 The majority made
clear that “[t]he critical question . . . is not whether the dog
sniff occurs before or after the officer issues a ticket . . . but
whether conducting the sniff ‘prolongs’—i.e., adds time to—
‘the stop’ . . . .”12 Third, there will be some sorting out of the
activities that are permissibly related to a traffic stop. Dog
sniffs are not included; they “[l]ack[] the same close connec-
tion to roadway safety as the ordinary inquiries,” such as
checking the driver’s license, determining if there are out-
standing warrants, and inspecting the registration and proof
of insurance.13 But surely the law on this will develop over
time.
In another traffic-stop case, Heien v. North Carolina,14 the
Court found that a search or seizure made pursuant to a rea-
sonable mistake of law does not violate the Fourth Amend-
ment. In Heien, a sheriff’s officer pulled over a car for a broken
left brake light. After the driver and passenger gave consent to
search the vehicle, the deputy found a bag of cocaine. The
North Carolina Court of Appeals found that the initial traffic
stop was invalid because, according to the state’s vehicle code,
driving with “a [single] stop lamp” was not a violation of law.15
The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed, finding the mis-
understanding of law to be reasonable, and the Supreme Court
affirmed.
Chief Justice Roberts authored the majority opinion, mak-
ing clear that even if a police officer is mistaken about the law
justifying a search or seizure, that search or seizure does not
violate the Constitution if the mistake is reasonable. After all,
the “ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reason-
ableness.”16 The Court had already held that searches and
seizures based on mistakes of fact can provide reasonable sus-
picion or probable cause, and “[t]here is no reason . . . why
this same result” should not be acceptable “when reached by
way of a similarly reasonable mistake of law.”17 The Court had
“little difficulty” concluding that the officer’s error of law was
reasonable based on a perceived ambiguity in the pertinent
statute.18 Justice Kagan, joined by Justice Ginsburg, concurred
to emphasize that only “gen-
uinely ambiguous” statutes,
those requiring “hard inter-
pretive work”—as this one
did—can support a claim of
a reasonable mistake of law.19
The mistake must be objec-
tively reasonable; an officer’s subjective understanding of the
law is not relevant.20 Justice Sotomayor dissented, arguing
that a “fixed legal yardstick”— the actual state of the law, not
just a reasonable understanding of it—should govern.21
The decision is significant in a number of respects. In
addition to the substantive holding itself, the majority
employed the mistake framework to determine that the
seizure did not violate the Fourth Amendment at all, as
opposed to finding that there was a violation of the Fourth
Amendment but that the exclusionary rule should not
apply.22 This distinction proved important to the Illinois
Supreme Court. Illinois has sometimes interpreted the scope
of its exclusionary rule more broadly than the federal exclu-
sionary rule, but it generally construes the state constitution’s
“search and seizure” phrase consistent with that of the fed-
eral constitution. Following Heien, the Illinois Supreme
Court found that a mistaken belief about the legality of a
trailer hitch did not make a stop unreasonable under either
the state or federal constitutions.23 A number of state courts
have already applied Heien to uphold seizures based upon
reasonable mistakes of law in a variety of settings.24 However,
not every mistake will do. At least one court has found that
an officer’s mistake of law was unreasonable where the state
courts had already clearly construed the meaning of the rele-
vant statute.25
ADMINISTRATIVE SEARCHES
City of Los Angeles v. Patel26 provided a significant victory
for hotel operators and their guests, but it may have repercus-
sions for more than 100 municipalities across the country. A
provision of the Los Angeles Municipal Code compels hotel
operators to obtain and record specified information about
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their guests.27 It also requires
hotels to make guest records
available to officers for inspec-
tion upon request. A group of
motel operators sued, alleging
the provision was facially
unconstitutional. The Supreme
Court agreed in an opinion by
Justice Sotomayor.
The case involved a facial
challenge to the code provision.
The municipal ordinance vio-
lated the Fourth Amendment
because it failed to provide hotel operators with an opportu-
nity for precompliance review before a neutral decision maker.
Admittedly, because the searches at issue served a special need
beyond conducting criminal investigations, namely, ensuring
compliance with the recordkeeping requirement (which in
turn deterred criminal enterprises on hotel premises), they fell
beyond the ambit of the warrant requirement.28 Nonetheless,
such administrative searches still require the opportunity for
precompliance review. The ability to search without precom-
pliance review was not necessary to the regulatory scheme, and
the inspection scheme at issue did not provide an adequate
substitute for a warrant.29 The Court suggested that searches
utilizing administrative subpoenas would be constitutional
since an objecting hotel operator could move to quash the sub-
poena before any search takes place.30 Justice Scalia authored
the main dissent, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice
Thomas.31 He argued that the searches were necessary to deter
criminal activity in motels, “obvious havens for those who
trade in human misery.”32 Because hotels are closely regulated
industries subject to stricter government regulation, warrant-
less searches are not unreasonable. 
The Term also included a per curiam reversal involving a
civil search. The petitioner in Grady v. North Carolina33 was a
recidivist sex offender whom the State sought to subject to
satellite-based monitoring under a civil statute. Grady claimed
that ordering him to wear a monitoring device and continu-
ously tracking his movements would be an unreasonable
search. The North Carolina courts rejected his challenge on the
theory that civil monitoring is distinguishable from searches in
criminal cases such as United States v. Jones.34 The justices
granted Grady’s petition for a writ of certiorari and summarily
reversed. In light of Jones and Florida v. Jardines,35 a state “con-
ducts a search when it attaches a device to a person’s body,
without consent, for the purpose of tracking that individual’s
movements.”36 The civil-criminal distinction was immaterial,
since the Fourth Amendment extends beyond criminal inves-
tigations. “[T]he government’s purpose in collecting informa-
tion does not control whether the method of collection consti-
tutes a search.”37 The Justices remanded for the state courts to
determine whether the monitoring program is reasonable
when it is properly viewed as a search.
SIXTH AMENDMENT
The Court’s sole Sixth Amendment decision, Ohio v. Clark,38
is the latest in the Crawford v. Washington39 line of cases. While
the holding may appear uncontroversial, the decision further
revealed the rift among the justices regarding their fealty to
Crawford.
Crawford, of course, rejected the approach to the Con-
frontation Clause marked by Ohio v. Roberts, under which
hearsay statements against a criminal defendant were admis-
sible if the statements bore “adequate indicia of reliability.”40
Crawford instead “prohibits the introduction of testimonial
statements by a nontestifying witness, unless the witness is
‘unavailable to testify, and the defendant had a prior oppor-
tunity for cross-examination.’”41 Statements “are testimonial
when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no 
. . . ongoing emergency” and that “the primary purpose” is
“to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later
criminal prosecution.”42 Applying the “primary purpose”
test, the Supreme Court has found the following to be non-
testimonial: calls to a 911 operator,43 a dying victim’s identi-
fication of his shooter (who was still on the loose),44 and a
lab report arguably not offered for its truth.45 Statements
deemed testimonial include descriptions of spousal abuse
provided to police46 and reports from forensic analysts.47 In
Clark, the Supreme Court applied the “primary purpose” test
to statements made by three-year-old “L.P.” to preschool
teachers. L.P. appeared at school with injuries that suggested
child abuse. He told teachers that his mother’s boyfriend had
caused the injuries. At trial, the state introduced L.P.’s state-
ments to his teachers; L.P. did not testify. Though the justices
split on their reasoning and language, the Court unanimously
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48. Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2181-83.
49. Id. at 2183, 2184 (Scalia, J., concurring).
50. Id. at 2185, 2186 (Thomas, J., concurring).
51. Id. at 2184 (Scalia, J., concurring).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 2185. Justice Scalia argues that “[t]his dictum gets the bur-
den precisely backwards . . . . The burden is on the prosecutor
who seeks to introduce evidence over this [Confrontation Clause]
bar to prove a long-established practice of introducing specific
kinds of evidence . . . .” Id.
54. Decisions appear simply to cite Clark as the latest Crawford case.
See, e.g., United States v. Clifford, 791 F.3d 884, 888 (8th Cir.
2015) (admission of a young child’s spontaneous statements to
her mother’s boyfriend was not testimonial); People v. Hinton,
2015 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 6097, at *23 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug.
24, 2015) (in-custody defendant’s inculpatory statements during a
recorded phone call were nontestimonial); and Holloman v. Com-
monwealth, 775 S.E.2d 434, 446 (Va. Ct. App. 2015) (a gang note-
book was not created for the purposes of an investigation or pros-
ecution).
55. 135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015).
56. 553 U.S. 35 (2008) (plurality opinion).
57. Id. at 61-62.
58. Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2734-35.
59. Id. at 2737.
60. Id. at 2738-39, 2741-42.
61. Id. at 2780, 2785-86 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting, joined by Justices
Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan).
62. Id. at 2795.
ruled that admitting the statements did not violate the Con-
frontation Clause. 
Justice Alito wrote for the Court. Applying Crawford and its
progeny, the justices found that L.P.’s statements occurred in
the context of an ongoing emergency. Because there was no
indication that the primary purpose of the conversation
between L.P. and his teachers was to gather evidence for Clark’s
prosecution, the admission of testimony about L.P.’s out-of-
court statements did not violate the Confrontation Clause even
though the teachers were subject to mandatory reporting
requirements.48 Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Ginsburg, con-
curred, emphasizing that the statements were non-testimonial
under the precedent applicable to informal police interroga-
tion.49 Justice Thomas was of the view that the child’s state-
ments did not “bear sufficient indicia of solemnity to qualify as
testimonial.”50
While at first blush this case appears uncontroversial, Jus-
tice Scalia had harsh words for the majority. He wrote sepa-
rately to “protest the Court’s shoveling of fresh dirt upon the
Sixth Amendment right of confrontation so recently rescued
from the grave in Crawford v. Washington.”51 Justice Scalia
took issue with the majority’s characterization of Crawford as
merely a “different approach” from Ohio v. Roberts, and he
assailed Justice Alito for his “hostility to Crawford and its prog-
eny.”52 More substantively, Justice Scalia criticized the majority
for what he took as dictum suggesting that defendants must
show that the evidence would have been excluded in criminal
cases at the time of the founding. If true, that would signal a
significant retreat from Crawford,53 though subsequent courts
do not appear to read the case that way.54
EIGHTH AMENDMENT
In Glossip v. Gross,55 the only Eighth Amendment case
decided last Term, the Court held that midazolam—a contro-
versial drug used to render prisoners unconscious as part of
Oklahoma’s lethal-injection protocol—worked adequately
enough to survive Eighth Amendment scrutiny. In doing so,
the Court affirmed a test used by a plurality of the Court in a
previous method-of-execution case, Baze v. Rees.56
When Oklahoma adopted lethal injection as its chosen form
of capital punishment, the state settled on a three-drug proto-
col that included sodium thiopental, a chemical that produces
unconsciousness during an execution. In Baze, the Court
upheld Kentucky’s use of this
same three-drug protocol,
rejecting a challenge by
inmates who claimed that the
risk of a botched execution was
so great that it effectively
amounted to the infliction of
cruel and unusual punish-
ment.57 After Baze, Oklahoma
was unable to secure this and
another barbiturate, so it
turned to midazolam, a seda-
tive it had not used before, to
render prisoners unconscious during lethal injection. The
plaintiffs in Glossip brought a federal civil-rights action chal-
lenging the constitutionality of Oklahoma’s midazolam execu-
tion protocol following the state’s botched execution of another
inmate, Clayton Lockett.58
Justice Alito, writing for a five-justice majority, determined
that Oklahoma’s new drug protocol did not amount to an
unconstitutional infliction of cruel and unusual punishment.
Drawing upon the test from the Baze plurality opinion, the
Court concluded that to obtain a preliminary injunction, pris-
oners must show “a likelihood that they can establish both that
Oklahoma’s lethal injection protocol creates a demonstrated
risk of severe pain and that the risk is substantial when com-
pared to the known and available alternatives.”59 Here, their
claims failed both requirements—petitioners did not establish
that the district court committed clear error in finding mida-
zolam would not inflict severe pain and suffering, nor could
they suggest an alternative method of execution.60
Justice Sotomayor penned the principal dissent, arguing
that Oklahoma’s use of midazolam violated the Eighth Amend-
ment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment
because the drug could not be trusted to render and keep an
inmate insensate, leaving him vulnerable to pain at the later
stages of the execution.61 She was particularly critical of the
majority’s requirement that the inmates identify an alternative
method of execution; she would have held that the State
should not be allowed to use an objectively intolerable method
simply because an alternative cannot be identified.62
Justice Breyer authored another dissent, joined by Justice
Ginsburg, suggesting that the death penalty was per se unconsti-
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63. Id. at 2755, 2756 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The Glossip petitioners
subsequently petitioned the Court for a rehearing of their case
based on Justice Breyer’s dissent. The Court denied their petition.
Glossip v. Gross, 2015 U.S. LEXIS 4626, 84 U.S.L.W. 3099 (U.S.
Aug. 28, 2015). 
64. See id. at 2746, 2750 (Scalia, J., concurring, joined by Justice
Thomas) (“By arrogating to himself the power to overturn [the
Framers’] decision, Justice Breyer does not just reject the death
penalty, he rejects the Enlightenment.”); id. at 2750, 2752
(Thomas, J., concurring, joined by Justice Scalia) (attacking Justice
Breyer’s arguments as “based on cardboard stereotypes or cold
mathematical calculations”).
65. Manny Fernandez, Delays as Death-Penalty States Scramble for Exe-
cution Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2015, http://www.ny
times.com/2015/10/09/us/death-penalty-lethal-injection.html. 
66. Joint Stipulation for Administrative Closing of Case, Glossip v. Gross
(Oct. 16, 2015) (No. CIV-14-665-F), http://www.ok.gov/ oag/docu-
ments/Glossip%20-%20Joint%20Stipulation.pdf; see also Amanda
Sakuma, Oklahoma Won’t Be Executing Death Row Inmates Anytime
Soon, MSNBC, Oct. 16, 2015, http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/
oklahoma-wont-be-executing-death-row-inmates-anytime-soon.
67. 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015).
68. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) (emphasis added).
69. See James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192 (2007) (clause covers
Florida’s crime of attempted burglary); Sykes v. United States, 564
U.S. 1 (2011) (clause covers Indiana’s crime of vehicular flight
from a law-enforcement officer); Begay v. United States, 553 U.S.
137 (2008) (clause does not cover New Mexico’s crime of driving
under the influence); Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122
(2009) (clause does not cover Illinois’s crime of failure to report
to a penal institution).
70. 495 U.S. 575 (1990).
71. Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2557 (quoting Begay, 553 U.S. at 141).
72. Id. at 2557-58. 
73. Id. at 2558 (quoting United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255
U.S. 81, 91 (1921)).
74. Id. at 2563.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 2557.
77. Id. at 2563 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 2563 (Thomas, J., con-
curring). Justice Thomas wrote a lengthy opinion addressing the
Due Process Clause and the vagueness doctrine.
tutional and inviting full brief-
ing on the issue.63 His lengthy
dissent points to issues of lack
of reliability in assessing
whether death is the appropri-
ate punishment, arbitrariness
in application of the sanction,
and delays in the process. This
drew sharp separate opinions
from Justices Scalia and
Thomas, attacking the sugges-
tion that the death penalty is
unconstitutional per se.64
And in a final twist, after
discovering that it was about
to use the wrong drug to induce cardiac arrest, the State of
Oklahoma halted Richard Glossip’s execution two hours before
it was scheduled to occur.65 Since then, the State has reached
an agreement with death-row inmates that will effectively pro-
hibit any executions until later in 2016.66
DUE PROCESS & EQUAL PROTECTION
Last Term saw the justices give up on efforts to interpret a
federal statute, finding the statute vague. The Court also gave
us a ruling about harmless error in the context of jury selection.
DUE PROCESS CLAUSE—VAGUENESS
The Court granted certiorari in Johnson v. United States67 to
decide whether unlawful possession of a short-barreled shotgun
is a “violent felony” under the federal Armed Career Criminal
Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), which makes a defendant pre-
viously convicted of violent felonies eligible for an increased
sentence. Johnson was the Court’s fifth go since 2007 at the
“residual clause” of the act that purports to define certain vio-
lent felonies. After oral argument in November 2014, the jus-
tices called for supplemental briefing and heard re-argument in
April 2015. Then they threw in the towel, finding that this
“residual clause” of the ACCA violates the Fifth Amendment’s
Due Process Clause because it is unconstitutionally vague. 
The ACCA defines “violent felony” in several ways. It could
be a crime that involves the “use, attempted use, or threatened
use of physical force” against another; it could be burglary,
arson, extortion, or an offense involving use of explosives; or
it could be an offense that “otherwise involves conduct that pre-
sents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.”68 The
italicized phrase has come to be known as the “residual
clause,” and the prosecution sought to qualify Johnson’s prior
conviction under this provision. In four cases decided since
2007, the justices have interpreted the residual clause of the
ACCA without striking it down.69 In those decisions, the
Court applied Taylor v. United States,70 which explained that
whether a crime is a violent felony under the ACCA requires a
categorical approach; that is, assessing “how the law defines
the offense” and “not . . . how an individual offender might
have committed it on a particular occasion.”71
The opinion of the Court in Johnson, written by Justice Scalia
and joined by five other justices, concludes that there is too
much uncertainty in categorically determining what kind of
conduct “the ordinary case” involves, as well as “how much
risk it takes for a crime to qualify as a violent felony.”72 In one
prior case, the Court had assessed risk by comparison to the
closest analog among the enumerated crimes in the ACCA; two
of the prior cases sought to rely upon statistics; and a fourth
took an entirely different approach. This “failure of ‘persistent
efforts . . . to establish a standard’” confirms that the statute is
vague.73 Stare decisis, the majority says, “does not matter for its
own sake” but only to promote the consistency and pre-
dictability of the law.74 Because application of the residual
clause has proved to be unworkable, standing by precedent
would “undermine . . . the goals that stare decisis is meant to
serve.”75 The residual clause “denies fair notice to defendants
and invites arbitrary enforcement by judges.”76 Justices
Kennedy and Thomas concurred; they would have found that
the offense was not a violent felony under the prior court rul-
ings, and they would not have struck down the residual
clause.77 Justice Alito dissented, finding no good reason for
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overruling precedent “except the Court’s weariness with ACCA
cases.”78 Justice Alito also would have upheld the residual
clause, primarily on the theory that the ACCA does not refer to
“the ordinary case” and whether the clause applies or not can
be determined by looking at the specific circumstances of each
crime.79
A few points to note. First, the Court struck down only the
residual clause, not the other parts of the ACCA (including the
provision with enumerated offenses). Thus, the holding need
not relate to similar statutes with enumerated offenses. Second,
the Court itself emphasized that its holding does not automat-
ically apply to the “dozens of federal and state criminal laws”
that include terminology such as “substantial risk,” “grave
risk,” and “unreasonable risk,” since almost none of these
other laws link the phrase to a confusing list of examples, as
opposed to conduct on a particular occasion.80 The impact of
Johnson remains to be seen. This decision may open, or at least
push slightly ajar, a door to constitutional challenges to state
laws that contain at least some language similar to that of the
residual clause.
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE—BATSON
The Term also delivered a Batson81 case, Davis v. Ayala,82
though it was presented in a complicated federal habeas corpus
framework. In Davis, the Court considered whether a federal
habeas petitioner with Batson claims was entitled to relief
when the state court determined that even though there was
probably error in his case, it was harmless. A closely divided
Court concluded that because the state court was statutorily
entitled to deference, and because its findings were reasonable,
the federal habeas petition should be denied.83
During jury selection in Ayala’s case, the prosecution used
its peremptory challenges to exclude 18 prospective jurors,
including all 7 African-Americans and Hispanics in the venire.
The defense raised Batson objections three times. While the
trial court required the prosecution each time to provide its
reasons for the strikes, the judge allowed the prosecution to
offer its justifications ex parte so as not to be forced to reveal
trial strategy. Each time the trial court found that the prosecu-
tion had sufficient race-neutral reasons to exclude those jurors.
Ayala was subsequently convicted and sentenced to death.84
On appeal, the California Supreme Court held that excluding
defense counsel was error under state and possibly federal law
but that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Ayala sought federal habeas corpus relief, which the court of
appeals determined should be granted.85 The Supreme Court
reversed, 5-4. 
In an opinion authored by
Justice Alito, the Court first dis-
cussed the habeas framework.
Under Brecht v. Abrahamson,86 a
petitioner must show that a trial
error resulted in actual preju-
dice, and this test subsumes the
demanding standards of 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d), the Antiterror-
ism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996, when the state
court has found an error to be
harmless.87 Applying this defer-
ential framework, the majority reviewed the prosecution’s
explanations for its peremptory challenges. There was suffi-
cient information in the record for the trial court to rule on
the Batson objections without the defense present.88 “Ayala
cannot establish actual prejudice or that no fair-minded jurist
could agree with the state court’s application” of the test for
harmless error.89
The dissent, written by Justice Sotomayor and joined by
Justices Ginsburg, Kagan, and Breyer, expressed no disagree-
ment with the standard of review described by the majority but
contended that its analysis misidentified the issue: the major-
ity focused on whether the trial court was wrong to reject
Ayala’s Batson objections based on the record rather than on
the exclusion of his attorneys from the Batson hearings.90
Ayala’s lawyers could have played two critical roles had they
been present at the Batson hearings. First, they would have
been able to question the credibility of the offered race-neutral
explanations. Second, they could have made a record and
ensured that the trial judge actually considered the defense
arguments against the offered reasons. Counsel’s presence was
all the more important given the length of the jury-selection
process (3 months) and the apparent loss of the majority of the
jurors’ questionnaires.91 And, with respect to one of the chal-
lenged jurors, the dissenters concluded that “had Ayala’s
lawyers been present at the Batson hearing” to point out simi-
larities between that juror and a white juror who was not
struck, it is probable that “his strong Batson claim would have
turned out to be a winning one.”92 There were also two inter-
esting concurrences. Justice Kennedy joined the majority but
expressed his grave concern that Ayala has apparently been in
solitary confinement for more than 25 years.93 Justice Thomas
retorted that “the accommodations in which Ayala is housed
are a far sight more spacious than those in which his victims 
. . . now rest.”94
78. Id. at 2573, 2575 (Alito, J., dissenting).  
79. Id. at 2578-80.
80. Id. at 2561.
81. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
82. 135 S. Ct. 2187 (2015).
83. Id. at 2208.
84. Id. at 2193-95.
85. Id. at 2195-97.
86. 507 U.S. 619 (1993).
87. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. at 2198-99.
88. For example, counsel’s presence was not necessary for the trial
judge to compare answers of white and African-American jurors
(id. at 2201), to assess the prosecutor’s concern about a juror’s lim-
ited English proficiency (id. at 2204), or to evaluate the sincerity
of a prosecutor’s concern about a juror’s willingness to impose the
death penalty (id. at 2205).
89. Id. at 2203.
90. Id. at 2210, 2211-12 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 2212-13.
92. Id. at 2215-16.
93. Id. at 2208 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
94. Id. at 2210 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW
AND EVIDENCE
The federal criminal-law
cases of this Term involved
interpreting a wide array of
criminal statutes. We will
review two decisions in which
the Court assessed scienter
requirements, two others with
ambiguous statutory terms,
and an opinion addressing
whether a felon whose
firearms are seized can trans-
fer those firearms to another.
Additionally, we venture per-
haps slightly outside of our
charter to summarize an
important civil decision interpreting Federal Rule of Evidence
606(b) and the use of evidence to impeach a jury’s verdict. 
FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW—MENTAL STATE
In Elonis v. United States,95 sometimes called the “Facebook
threats” case, the Court read a scienter requirement into a fed-
eral criminal statute but did not specify the particular state of
mind required for conviction or reach the lurking constitu-
tional question. Anthony Elonis posted violent, graphic, and
self-made rap lyrics on Facebook that referenced his estranged
wife, co-workers, an unspecified kindergarten class, and an
FBI agent. While Elonis often posted the material with dis-
claimers that his lyrics were fictitious, others viewed them dif-
ferently. Elonis was charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 875(c),
which prohibits transmitting in interstate commerce “any
communication containing any threat . . . to injure the person
of another.” The district court denied Elonis’s request for a jury
instruction that the government must prove that he intended
to communicate a true threat, and it instead instructed the jury
that it was enough if he intentionally made a statement that a
reasonable person would view as a threat.96 Elonis was con-
victed, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court
reversed.
As Chief Justice John Roberts wrote for the Court, the text
of § 875(c) did not specify any particular mental-state require-
ment.97 The majority turned to Morissette v. United States98 and
other precedents for the general rule that a defendant must be
“blameworthy in mind” and that criminal statutes will be
interpreted to include “broadly applicable scienter require-
ments” even if the statute does not contain them.99 When the
statute is silent on the required mental state, the Court will
“read into the statute ‘only that mens rea which is necessary to
separate wrongful conduct from otherwise innocent con-
duct.’”100 Because the “crucial element separating legal inno-
cence from wrongful conduct” was the threatening nature of
the communication, the lower courts erred in ruling that crim-
inal liability depended on how Elonis’s posts were understood
by a reasonable person, as opposed to what Elonis thought.
Negligence, the Court held, was not enough.101 However, the
justices declined to decide whether recklessness would suffice
and remanded to the lower courts to decide the issue.102
This refusal to decide the requisite mental state led Justice
Alito to write separately. While Justice Alito concurred that sci-
enter was required, he would have found that recklessness in
making threatening statements was enough.103 Because he also
would have upheld the conviction on a standard of reckless-
ness, Justice Alito also reached the First Amendment issue,
finding that the Free Speech Clause did not protect Elonis’s
Facebook posts.104 Justice Thomas was the lone dissenter and,
like Justice Alito, castigated the Court for “throw[ing] every-
one from appellate judges to everyday Facebook users into a
state of uncertainty.”105 He would have upheld a general-intent
approach and found no First Amendment violation.106
In the other scienter case of the Term, McFadden v. United
States,107 the Court unanimously held that the government can
establish that a defendant “knowingly” distributed a controlled
substance “analogue” in two ways: (1) proving that a defen-
dant knew that he was dealing with a controlled substance or
something treated as a controlled substance under the Ana-
logue Act, 21 U.S.C. § 813; or (2) proving that a defendant
knew the specific analogue he was dealing with, even if he did
not know its legal status as an analogue.108 McFadden sold hal-
lucinogenic bath salts. Because the lower court found that the
statute only required that the government prove he meant for
the substance to be consumed by humans, the Court vacated
and remanded for further proceedings. McFadden and Elonis
together afford some guidance in assessing mens rea require-
ments in statutes that either have no explicit scienter require-
ment (Elonis) or have a requirement that must be distributed
to the statute’s other elements (McFadden).
FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW—AMBIGUOUS STATUTES
Yates v. United States,109 one of the decisions construing
ambiguous statutes, was not the most important case of the
Term, but it is tough to beat for amusement value. The ques-
tion was whether a fisherman who threw undersized fish from
his boat destroyed “tangible object[s]” in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1519, the “anti-shredding” provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002. Sarbanes-Oxley was passed in the wake of Enron’s
95. 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015).
96. 135 S. Ct. at 2007.
97. Id. at 2008.
98. 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
99. 135 S. Ct. at 2009 (quoting Morisette, supra note 98, and United
States v. X–Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 70 (1994)).
100. Id. at 2010 (quotations omitted).
101. Id. at 2011-12.
102. Id. at 2013.
103. Id. at 2013, 2014-16 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
104. Id. at 2016-17.
105. Id. at 2018 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 2021, 2028.
107. 135 S. Ct. 2298 (2015).
108. Id. at 2305.
109. 135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015).
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accounting fraud and revelations that Arthur Andersen had
destroyed potentially incriminating documents.
The facts of this case seem made to amuse first-year law stu-
dents.110 A fish-and-game officer boarded the Miss Katie, a
commercial fishing vessel captained by defendant John Yates.
Federal regulations at the time required immediate release of
grouper less than 20 inches long, and the officer found 72 fish
that fell short of that mark. He separated the undersized fish
from the rest of the catch and ordered Yates to leave them
undisturbed until the Miss Katie returned to port. But when the
officer visited the boat several days later, he discovered that
Yates had ordered a crew member to throw the undersized fish
over the side and replace them with slightly larger denizens of
the deep. Yates was subsequently charged with the federal
crime of destroying “any record, document or tangible object
with the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence” a federal
investigation. He was convicted following a jury trial, and the
court of appeals affirmed his conviction. A bare majority of the
Supreme Court reversed.
Justice Ginsburg wrote a plurality opinion in which three
other justices joined, finding that the lower courts applied too
broad a definition of “tangible object.” Justice Alito concurred,
providing the fifth vote for reversal. The plurality looked to the
context of Sarbanes-Oxley, which was enacted specifically to
“prohibit . . . corporate document-shredding to hide evidence
of financial wrongdoing.”111 While the justices acknowledged
that the ordinary meaning of “tangible object” could encom-
pass anything with discrete form, the plurality found that the
specific context for the disputed language, the broader context
of the statute, and principles of statutory construction (such as
avoiding a reading that would render parts of the statute super-
fluous) counseled a narrower construction. “It is highly
improbable that Congress would have buried a general spolia-
tion statute covering objects of any and every kind in a provi-
sion targeting fraud in financial record-keeping.”112 Thus,
“tangible object” should be read “to cover only objects one can
use to record or preserve information, not all objects in the
physical world.”113 Concurring, Justice Alito offered a similar
but not identical definition of “tangible object,” concluding
that the term “should refer to something similar to records or
documents.”114
The dissent, penned by Justice Kagan, took issue with how
both the Ginsburg plurality and the Alito concurrence inter-
preted section 1519. While the dissenting justices agreed “that
context matters in interpreting statutes,” they argued that the
plain text of the statute and the context surrounding its enact-
ment both pointed to a broad
reading of “tangible object.”115
The dissent suggested that the
majority reached its decision
because of “overcriminalization
and excessive punishments in
the U.S. Code.”116 Although Jus-
tice Kagan agreed that section
1519 grants “prosecutors too much leverage and sentencers
too much discretion” and reflects “a deeper pathology in the
federal criminal code,” it is not up to the Court to reconstruct
laws written by Congress.117
The other case with ambiguous statutory terms is Whitfield
v. United States.118 There a unanimous Court ruled that the
statute enhancing penalties for bank robberies that involve
forced “accompaniment” does not require movement over a
substantial distance; the forced-accompaniment provision of
18 U.S.C. § 2113(e) applies even if the movement occurs
entirely within a single building or over a short distance. The
Court looked to the dictionary definition of “accompany” and
noted that the danger involved in forced accompaniment does
not depend on the distance traveled.119
FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW—TRANSFER OF SEIZED
FIREARMS
Another interesting federal criminal case is Henderson v.
United States.120 There a unanimous Court held that a con-
victed felon whose firearms are seized by the government
before his conviction can transfer those firearms to a seller or
other third party unless doing so would allow him to later
retake control over those firearms and either use them or direct
their use.121 The decision interprets the federal statute, 18
U.S.C. § 922(g), that bars felons from possessing firearms.
While the Court did not decide any constitutional claims, the
opinion may be worth a read given the prevalence of felon-in-
possession statutes among the states. 
The opinion begins by describing “the proverbial sticks
from the bundle of property rights” that Henderson retained
over his firearms despite his conviction.122 The Court
explained that upon conviction, Henderson had lost the stick
of possession, which encompasses both actual and construc-
tive possession, and that he would still constructively possess
the firearms if they were transferred to anyone who would
return them to Henderson or follow his instructions for their
use. But the Court separated that from the right to sell or oth-
erwise dispose of his firearms, which Henderson retained
110. And Supreme Court justices as well. See id. at 1091 (Kagan, J.,
dissenting) (referencing Dr. Seuss, One Fish Two Fish Red Fish
Blue Fish (1960)); id. at 1094 (arguing that the plurality’s “fish-
ing expedition comes up empty”).
111. Id. at 1081 (Ginsburg, J., joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Jus-
tices Breyer and Sotomayor).
112. Id. at 1087. 
113. Id. at 1081.
114. Id. at 1089 (Alito, J., concurring). He concluded that the combi-
nation of “the statute’s list of nouns, list of verbs, and its title”
suggested that Congress intended the statute to apply to a spe-
cific category of items, asking—for example—“[h]ow does one
make a false entry in a fish?” Id. at 1089-90. 
115. Id. at 1090, 1092 (Kagan, J., joined by Justices Scalia, Kennedy,
and Thomas).
116. Id. at 1100.
117. Id. at 1101.
118. 135 S. Ct. 785 (2015).
119. Id. at 789.
120. 135 S. Ct. 1780 (2015).
121. Id. at 1783.
122. Id. at 1784.
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despite his conviction.123 What
matters is whether the felon
exercises any control over the
firearms after the transfer, so “a
court . . . may approve the
transfer of guns consistently
with § 922(g) if, but only if,
that disposition prevents the
felon from later exercising con-
trol over those weapons, so that
he could either use them or tell
someone else how to do so.”124
EVIDENCE—IMPEACHING A
VERDICT
The Court also decided a
civil case about impeaching a
jury’s verdict. The opinion con-
strues Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) and may be of particu-
lar interest in jurisdictions with evidence codes similar to the
Federal Rules. 
In Warger v. Shauers,125 the plaintiff moved for a new trial
after one juror gave an affidavit about statements made by
another juror that suggested she had lied during voir dire. The
Court held that the Federal Rules of Evidence precluded the
district court from considering the affidavit; the opinion artic-
ulates a strong version of the common-law anti-impeachment
rule.
The decision construes Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b),
which provides that a juror may not testify about any state-
ment made in deliberations as part of “an inquiry into the
validity of a verdict.” A claim about misconduct during voir
dire plainly entails an inquiry into the validity of a verdict
regardless of whether the misconduct had a direct effect on the
verdict.126 The Court acknowledged that some jurisdictions
have a weak anti-impeachment rule. For example, under what
is sometimes known as the “Iowa” approach, jury testimony is
only excluded when it relates to matters that “inhered in the
verdict,” and that approach has been used to allow juror testi-
mony challenging conduct during voir dire.127 However, as Jus-
tice Sotomayor wrote for a unanimous Court, the U.S. Supreme
Court rejected the “Iowa” approach early on, and the plain lan-
guage of Rule 606(b) is consistent with these early cases.128
The Court also turned aside the plaintiff’s contentions that the
exceptions in Rule 606(b) applied here and that the narrow
interpretation of the rule unconstitutionally infringed the right
to an impartial jury.129
CIVIL RIGHTS
There were several substantial civil-rights cases in the last
Term. One decided the standard to apply in excessive-force
lawsuits; others addressed the doctrine of qualified immunity.
In the most significant of the cases, Kingsley v. Henderson,130
the Court held that to prove an excessive-force claim under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, a pretrial detainee only has to show that officers
purposefully or knowingly used force that was objectively
excessive, not that the officers were subjectively aware that
their use of force was unreasonable.131 Justice Breyer, writing
for the majority, explained that the objective standard was con-
sistent with precedent, primarily Bell v. Wolfish,132 where the
Court held that pretrial detainees cannot constitutionally be
subjected to excessive force that amounts to punishment.
According to the majority, under Bell, a pretrial detainee can
prevail on an excessive-force claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
even when there is no evidence of the officers’ intent to pun-
ish. He only has to show that the officers’ actions are not
“rationally related to a legitimate nonpunitive governmental
purpose” or that those actions exceed what is necessary for
that purpose.133 Second, the objective standard is “workable”;
that is, there are pattern jury instructions in several circuits
that incorporate that standard, and many officers are trained
“to interact with all detainees as if [their] conduct is subject to
an objective reasonableness standard.”134 Finally, the objective
standard “adequately protects an officer who acts in good
faith,” because the reasonableness of force is determined “from
the perspective and with the knowledge of the defendant offi-
cer.”135 The majority expressly declined to reach the question
of whether reckless use of force might be sufficient for liability,
though it acknowledged “that recklessness in some cases
might suffice as a standard for imposing liability.”136
Justice Scalia dissented along with Chief Justice Roberts and
Justice Thomas, arguing that the majority fundamentally mis-
read Bell because that case “makes intent to punish the focus
of its due process analysis.”137 Also, according to the dis-
senters, Kingsley did not need to use the Constitution to bring
claims against the officers since state statutory law and com-
mon law allowed him to bring a tort claim, and “the majority
overlook[ed] this in its tender-hearted desire to tortify the
Fourteenth Amendment.”138
The Court also decided qualified-immunity questions in a
handful of Section 1983 civil-rights cases. The justices were
poised to decide whether the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA) required police officers to provide accommodations to
an armed, violent, and mentally ill suspect when attempting to
bring her into custody. Instead, the Court resolved City and
County of San Francisco v. Sheehan139 on more narrow grounds,
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granting qualified immunity to officers who confronted, shot,
and injured a mentally ill woman wielding a knife in her pri-
vate room.140 No precedent clearly established that there was
not an objective need for the officers to enter Sheehan’s
room.141 In two per curiam decisions, Carroll v. Carman142 and
Taylor v. Barkes,143 the Court granted certiorari and summarily
reversed, finding that officials were entitled to qualified immu-
nity because they did not violate rights that were clearly estab-
lished by Supreme Court or circuit precedent. Carroll holds
that officers who approach property owners (for a “knock and
talk”) at their backyard door instead of their front door do not
violate clearly established Fourth Amendment rights. Taylor
finds that as of 2004, there was no clearly established principle
in Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent assuring an
incarcerated person’s right to proper implementation of ade-
quate suicide-prevention protocols.
HABEAS CORPUS
Last Term gave us several decisions addressing the stan-
dards to be applied in federal habeas proceedings. The most
significant of the decisions was in a case brought by a capital
defendant with intellectual deficits who claimed that he could
not be constitutionally executed under Atkins v. Virginia144 and
whose claim was summarily dismissed in state court.
In Brumfield v. Cain,145 the petitioner had based his Atkins
argument on mitigation evidence from the sentencing phase of
his trial, including his IQ score of 75, his fourth-grade reading
level, the identification of his learning disability, and his treat-
ment at psychiatric hospitals as a child. The state trial court
dismissed the Atkins claim without an evidentiary hearing and
without providing funds for further investigation, and the
Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed.146 On federal habeas cor-
pus, the district court ruled that Brumfield could overcome the
deferential habeas standards established under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2254(d): the state courts’ rejection of the claim did not com-
port with clearly established federal law and was based on an
unreasonable determination of facts. Following a federal evi-
dentiary hearing, the court went on to find that Brumfield was
intellectually disabled and therefore could not be executed.147
The Fifth Circuit reversed on the grounds that Brumfield could
not pass through the deferential habeas standards.148
The five-justice majority determined that the state court’s
ruling was based on an “unreasonable determination of the
facts” under § 2254(d)(2) with-
out answering the question of
whether the state court unrea-
sonably applied “clearly estab-
lished Federal law” under 
§ 2254(d)(1). The opinion,
authored by Justice Sotomayor,
focused on two factual determi-
nations made by the state trial
court—that Brumfield’s IQ indi-
cated he did not have an intellec-
tual disability and that there was
no evidence of adaptive impairment.149 The majority gave sub-
stantial deference to the trial court, noting that “[w]e may not
characterize these state-court factual determinations as unrea-
sonable ‘merely because [we] would have reached a different
conclusion . . . .’”150 Even so, Brumfield’s IQ was “squarely in
the range of potential intellectual disability,” and there was
“sufficient evidence to raise a question” as to whether Brum-
field met the criteria for adaptive impairment, so the factual
findings of the state court were unreasonable.151 The majority
emphasized that the threshold that needed to be overcome by
Brumfield for an evidentiary hearing was low; all he needed to
do was raise a “reasonable doubt” that he had an intellectual
disability.152 The Court remanded for further proceedings,
which presumably would permit the Court of Appeals to
review the finding that Brumfield was in fact intellectually dis-
abled.
Justice Thomas dissented. The dissenting and majority
opinions provide “a study in contrasts,” much like the stories
around which the dissent was framed.153 The dissent accuses
the majority of “recasting legal determinations as factual ones”
and would find that the state court’s factual determinations
were reasonable under § 2254(d)(1) and that the decision was
not an unreasonable application of clearly established law
relating to funding to develop an Atkins claim.154
Atkins itself left it to state courts to determine how to imple-
ment its constitutional rule. Brumfield may offer a bit more
guidance, particularly with respect to whether an Atkins claim
may be summarily denied or may deserve further develop-
ment. But moving forward, state courts should remain cau-
tious when looking to that guidance because it is specific to the
“reasonable doubt” standard for a defendant to get an Atkins
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hearing in Louisiana, and the Court did not discuss differences
among the states in standards relating to Atkins claims.
As in other recent terms, the justices also summarily
reversed several lower federal courts in habeas corpus cases.
Most of these decisions were issued to reinforce the highly def-
erential standards applied under the Antiterrorism and Effec-
tive Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA).155 Thus, in Lopez v.
Smith,156 the very first ruling of the Term, the Court empha-
sized that federal courts of appeals cannot rely on their own
precedent to determine whether a constitutional principle is
“clearly established” under AEDPA; only Supreme Court
precedent may do so.157 Drawing on Smith, Glebe v. Frost158
holds that a trial court’s restriction on defense counsel’s closing
argument was not “clearly established” as structural error; the
Washington Supreme Court had found the error to be harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt.  And in Woods v. Donald,159 the jus-
tices determined that the law was not “clearly established” by
United States v. Cronic160 that defense counsel’s absence from a
short portion of trial relating to a co-defendant amounted to
ineffective assistance for which prejudice would be presumed.
A LOOK AHEAD
The 2015 Term has just begun, but it already has a signifi-
cant criminal docket, including a substantial number of capi-
tal cases. Three cases argued in October raise questions about
how capital juries are instructed with respect to mitigating cir-
cumstances and whether conducting joint penalty-phase trials
of co-defendants violates the Eighth Amendment by creating a
substantial risk that the death penalty will be imposed arbi-
trarily.161 October also saw a broad challenge to Florida’s death-
penalty scheme, based on a claim that Florida’s advisory jury
fails to require a jury finding on all facts necessary to impose
the death penalty.162 The Court is taking on a Batson claim in a
capital case.163 And it will decide another death-penalty case
where it is alleged that the presiding chief justice of the state
supreme court had personally approved the capital charges
during his prior service as district attorney, had—during his
election campaign—expressed support for the death penalty in
this and other cases, and had then declined to recuse himself
from sitting in the petitioner’s case.164 On the non-capital side,
the justices are considering whether the ban on mandatory
imposition of life-without-parole sentences for juveniles, set
out in Miller v. Alabama,165 applies retroactively,166 and if
restraining a defendant’s untainted assets needed to retain
counsel violates the right to counsel and the Due Process
Clause.167 It is shaping up to be an interesting term. 
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Judges are likely to respond with outright skepticism whenthe validity of a Miranda waiver is questioned because thedefendant claimed to be merely “depressed” or “anxious” at
the time of arrest. They may be reassured that extensive research
on Miranda abilities has largely borne out this perspective. 
Symptoms of depression and anxiety, by themselves, do not
increase the chances of impaired Miranda comprehension or
reasoning. For instance, defendants with even moderate to
severe depression have roughly the same odds of impaired
functioning as those with negligible depression. Only at the
extreme levels of depression does a pattern of deficits emerge
for Miranda comprehension but not for Miranda reasoning.1
Likewise, a similar pattern is observed even for certain psy-
chotic symptoms, such as delusions and paranoid distrust.2 On
reflection, both legal and mental-health professionals alike can
discern a plausible explanation for this occurring. Since most
delusions and persecutory thoughts do not involve the police
or the criminal-justice system, these symptoms are likely to
have only a peripheral influence on Miranda-relevant abilities.
Only when psychotic symptoms become truly pervasive (i.e.,
extremely severe) are they likely to impair Miranda compre-
hension and reasoning. 
This introduction underscores several related points. First,
judges would be correct in not equating even serious mental
disorders with invalid Miranda waivers. Second, Miranda
issues—as we consider the totality of the circumstances—must
be viewed as much more complex and nuanced than any sim-
ple association of symptoms with functional legal abilities.
Judges, prosecutors, and defense counsel alike may share
similar misconceptions regarding the general public’s knowledge
and understanding of Miranda. For instance, faulty perceptions
abound with respect to both the content and the meaning of
Miranda warnings. The next two sections address fundamental
misunderstandings as they apply to Miranda comprehension
and reasoning. We begin with comprehension, focusing first on
fundamental myths about Miranda advisements.
THREE FUNDAMENTAL MYTHS ABOUT MIRANDA
WARNINGS
Rogers, Shuman, and Drogin3 first articulated major funda-
mental myths that threaten the integrity of Miranda warnings
and subsequent waivers. For instance, judges are sometimes
led to assume that there exists only one, simply written
Miranda warning that is applied uniformly across the United
States. This uniformity myth is shattered by research data that
have identified more than 1,000 unique variations, varying in
length by more than 500 words, with reading levels that range
from grade three to post-college.4
In 2011, Rogers5 proposed the “general neglect hypothesis”
in an effort to explain why Miranda issues were routinely over-
looked by the criminal courts—and in particular by the
defense bar. Based on very conservative estimates, thousands
of arrestees with severely impaired Miranda abilities6 are over-
looked or disregarded by defense attorneys each year. This sec-
tion examines three fundamental Miranda myths that are
strongly linked to the general neglect hypothesis. For example,
legal professionals are likely to overlook Miranda issues if they
believe they are irrelevant (i.e., “just a formality” because
everyone already knows them).
1. JUST A FORMALITY
One general misassumption is rooted in the notion that
nearly all Americans have a working knowledge of the Miranda
warnings. If this were true, then the communication of
Miranda rights would aptly be captured by the phrase, “just a
formality.” Although Leo7 was critical of police practices in
downplaying the importance of Miranda warnings in what he
has characterized as a “confidence game,” arresting officers
may genuinely see these advisements as nothing more than a
necessary bureaucratic exercise—mandated by the Supreme
Court—for defendants who are already fully apprised of their
rights. Simply put, if suspects already know their Miranda
rights, then anything more than the most cursory advisement
represents not only an unnecessary effort but also a potentially
damaging distraction at a critical moment in the investigation.
Judges will recognize instantly why the commonsensical
premise for knowing Miranda warnings seems incontestable:
Residents of the United States are constantly bombarded with
snatches of stereotyped Miranda recitations via countless police
dramas and various outlets of the public media. The litany
almost inevitably begins with “you have the right to remain
silent.” Based on this compelling yet false premise, many attor-
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neys from both the prosecution and defense unhesitatingly
assume that criminal defendants are fully cognizant of their
Miranda rights as expressed in Miranda warnings. This basic
myth, “everyone knows their Miranda warnings,”8 appears to be
strikingly pervasive across our communities. However, this view
is simply unwarranted. When a cross-section of the community
(e.g., juror pools) was surveyed anonymously,9 roughly one-
third (35%) conceded they had little or no Miranda knowledge.
Indeed, they were largely accurate in estimating their ignorance
of Miranda warnings. While performing moderately well on the
first component, right to silence, they faltered on the other three
basic components, averaging only 45% correct: risks of talking,
right to counsel, and free legal services. The fifth component of
most Miranda warnings,10 addressing the assertion of rights at
any time, or continuing rights, is almost universally missed.
Intuitively, it might be argued that investigating officers
could easily screen which arrestees were knowledgeable about
Miranda—simply by asking them. In this regard, more than
80% of Miranda advisements11 directly ask arrestees to affirm
their understanding of the Miranda warning. Most defendants
provide assents, however, through unelaborated responses
(e.g., “yes”). Shouldn’t the criminal courts view such terse yet
ubiquitous assents with slack-jawed skepticism?
Self-appraisals. High confidence does not necessarily trans-
late into high accuracy.12 For instance, about 30% of those pro-
fessing a high level of Miranda knowledge lacked any substan-
tive memory concerning the Miranda component of free legal
services.13
Adversarial context. Many arrestees justifiably view their
investigating officers as adversaries, who are responsible for
their arrests and current detentions.14 In this context, it is
entirely understandable why some detainees would be reluc-
tant to acknowledge any serious limitations, such as a limited
cognitive ability to understand Miranda, which might further
weaken—at least in their eyes—their adversarial position. 
Irrelevance. Many arrestees may perceive Miranda warnings
as inconsequential formalities and pay very little attention to
their content. Investigating officers may also communicate this
message—either directly or indirectly. As an example of the
latter, advisements may be delivered in a “mechanical, bureau-
cratic manner so as to trivialize their potential significance and
minimize their effectiveness.”15 Alternatively, warnings may be
presented with rapid-fire delivery, precluding any meaningful
comprehension. Canadian research on audio-recorded warn-
ings administered to actual arrestees has clocked average
speeds exceeding 200 words per minute.16 Besides the virtual
incomprehensibility of such breakneck speeds, the warnings
were frequently marred by omissions and inaccuracies.  
Acquiescence. The response style of “acquiescence” refers to
an almost reflexive agreement (i.e., yea-saying) that is especially
prominent when certain vulnerable defendants are confronted
by authority figures. For persons with intellectual disabilities,
yes-no-type questions—pervasive in Miranda waivers—are par-
ticularly vulnerable to acquiescence. This pattern of acquies-
cent responding is captured in the title of a classic study: When
in Doubt, Say Yes.17 However, this problem can easily be averted
by asking open-ended questions,18 such as “What do you
remember about your Miranda rights?” As a note of caution, the
courts should be skeptical if acquiescence is raised for adult
arrestees without major intellectual deficits.19 While genuine
cases of acquiescence can occur, they tend to be relatively infre-
quent for those with adequate cognitive abilities who lack other
relevant conditions, such as a dependent-personality disorder.
2. CONVEYING KNOWLEDGE VIA WARNINGS
The Supreme Court of the United States consistently
exhibits an unshakeable belief that Miranda warnings repre-
sent a highly effective method of conveying information. In
Berghuis v. Thompkins,20 for example, it was unquestioningly
assumed that the defendant was fully aware of his rights once
properly advised before questioning. Even after nearly three
hours, the Court concluded: “As questioning commences and
then continues, the suspect has the opportunity to consider
the choices he or she faces and to make a more informed deci-
sion, either to insist on silence or to cooperate.” In other
words, the Court appears to presume that all properly cau-
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tioned defendants remain fully apprised of their Miranda rights
and can even accumulate additional information via the ques-
tioning to further inform their decision making.
As noted by Blackwood and her colleagues,21 the Court
appears to have fallen victim to the long-disproved supposition
that the mind operates like an audio recorder that accurately
records and correctly accesses relevant information.22 The
“recorder fallacy” of memory has been described as “one of the
five great myths of popular psychology.”23 As observed by
Rogers and Drogin,24 however, the Court was not provided
with “any information to the contrary” (i.e., evidence of
impaired Miranda comprehension, either immediately after the
warning or following the several-hour delay). Given the pre-
sumption of competency, the Court was left with no choice but
to assume that the defendant was fully functioning at the time
of his incriminating statement.
A mere notification of rights cannot be equated with the edu-
cation of one’s rights. Simply because something is stated or
written does not mean that it was adequately heard or read.
Even if it were heard or read, that does not necessarily mean
that it was adequately comprehended. Obviously, judges can-
not be expected to take into account every instance of willful
inattention in determining the validity of Miranda waivers.
Nonetheless, Miranda warnings can include easily identifiable
elements that essentially preclude the real comprehension of
Miranda material. Such a direct statement likely provokes
healthy skepticism. Consider for the moment reading-compre-
hension levels. It makes no sense—legal or otherwise—to
expect a typical arrestee with a sixth- or seventh-grade reading
level to comprehend a Miranda advisement written at a col-
lege-graduate reading level. Furthermore, research has con-
vincingly demonstrated that lengthy oral warnings cannot be
comprehended.25 When given relatively short passages (less
than 90 words), well-educated adults are considered to have
superior memories if they can immediately recall as much as
72% of the material.26 With typical Miranda warnings—rang-
ing from 125 to 175 words—oral comprehension typically fails
to reach 50%, even when administered to college undergradu-
ates.27 At an even more basic level of analysis, research on hun-
dreds of pretrial defendants28 has clearly identified problematic
words that foil comprehension. Beyond difficult vocabulary
(e.g., “indigent”), other words are legalistic (e.g., “admissible”)
or have more commonly used definitions (e.g., “execute” as
meaning “to kill”). These issues are addressed more fully in the
section “Blueprint for Improving Miranda Warnings.”
3. OVERCOMING MIRANDA MISCONCEPTIONS
A third and final fundamental misconception is that
Miranda warnings go beyond conveying knowledge to help in
rectifying Miranda misconceptions. As a concrete example, not
just judges, prosecutors, and defense counsel, but rather nearly
everyone—arrestees, undergraduates, and members of the
community—can dutifully recite “you have the right to remain
silent.” Nevertheless, a substantial minority continue to
embrace the opposite belief. For instance, 20% of prospective
jurors,29 26% of undergraduates, and 31% of defendants30
wrongly believe that silence will be used as incriminating evi-
dence. This crucial fallacy can play a determinative role in the
waiving of rights.  
Rogers and Drogin31 identified approximately 20 misas-
sumptions that could have direct bearing on Miranda-waiver
decisions. For example, arrestees in about one-fourth of Amer-
ican jurisdictions are advised that they have the right to silence
until they have legal counsel.32 Assuming arrestees believe
what they are told, then the frame of reference changes from if
they should waive to when they should waive their rights and
talk. Given that offenders are susceptible to forfeiting long-
term considerations for immediate gains33 (e.g., “getting it
over”), they may decide to talk now without the benefit of
counsel. As a second example, many defendants believe their
statements to the police cannot be used as evidence without a
signed Miranda waiver. As a consequence of this gross misbe-
lief,34 arrestees may not recognize how almost any form of
admission can jeopardize their defenses. 
Miranda warnings constitute an ineffective method for recti-
fying fundamental Miranda misconceptions. This finding is
hardly surprising, inasmuch as the Supreme Court justices in
Miranda and subsequent cases could hardly have envisioned the
rampant nature of Miranda misconceptions that would emerge
in subsequent decades. Even if they did, the possible solutions
might further confound rather than enlighten detainees. 
Take, for example, the New Hampshire Supreme Court in
State v. Benoit35 that sought to remedy juvenile suspects’ core
misconceptions. Its model Miranda warning reassured juveniles
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that invoking their rights carried no penalty: “You will not be
punished for deciding to use these rights.”36 In their well-mean-
ing and concerted attempt to correct fundamental Miranda mis-
conceptions, the justices unwittingly created an exhaustive
Miranda advisement that is likely to overwhelm even the most
educated adult by its extraordinary length: 425 words for the
“misdemeanor” version and ballooning to 498 words for the
“felony” version. Juvenile suspects are then presented sequen-
tially with two forms of Miranda waivers totaling an additional
175 words for a grand total of 600 or more words. A common-
sensical question that begs for a response: “At what point do
juveniles simply stop listening or reading?”37
For the purposes of this article, we performed an additional
analysis on whether “frequent flyers” in the criminal-justice
system at either the “gold” (20-39 arrests) or “platinum” (40+
arrests) levels realized any substantive reductions in their
Miranda misconceptions when compared to defendants with
fewer than five arrests.38 Contrary to expectations, we found
virtually no improvements in average misconceptions: 7.6 for
inexperienced defendants versus 7.5 for gold-level and 7.0 for
platinum-level defendants. These data expose a fundamental
fallacy that repeated exposures to Miranda warnings serve an
educative function.39
Rogers and his colleagues40 directly tested whether repeated
exposure to Miranda advisements had any curative effect on
Miranda misconceptions. To provide greater opportunities for
learning, they exposed defendants to five differently worded
Miranda warnings, which were interspersed with other tasks to
avoid fatigue. To keep these participants actively involved, they
were tested on their immediate recall after each warning. Despite
this intense exposure, no overall reduction in Miranda miscon-
ceptions was observed, irrespective of whether the warnings
were provided orally or in writing. As the only bright note, a
small number of defendants with substantial difficulties showed
modest improvement, but they were clearly outnumbered by
those with no improvement or even worse performance.41
MIRANDA-WAIVER DECISIONS
Beyond police coercion impairing their voluntariness,42
Miranda waivers typically rely on knowing and intelligent
decisions to relinquish Miranda rights. As two distinct yet
related components,43 the “knowing” prong provides the nec-
essary foundation for an “intelligent” waiver. As an analogy
from chess, Rogers and Drogin observed that simply knowing
how the pieces move is, by itself, insufficient for rational deci-
sion making.44
Grisso45 described five important components of rational
decision making as it applies to legal competence.46 The five
levels are outlined below with illustrative questions that judges
will presumably want defense counsel to have asked to inves-
tigate the level of rational decision making: 
1. Awareness of the alternatives. Counsel may wish to inquire:
“What did you see as your choices after you were given the
Miranda warning?”
2. Potential consequences of each alternative. For each choice,
counsel may wish to simply inquire: “What did you think
would happen?”
3. Likelihood of these consequences. As a follow-up to #2, coun-
sel may wish to ask the following for each alternative: “How
certain were you that this would happen?”
4. Weighing the desirability of each consequence. As a follow-up
to #2, counsel may wish to query for each alternative: “How
much did you want this to happen?”
5. Comparative deliberation of alternatives and consequences. As
the final question, counsel may wish to ask: “How did you
make the decision?”
Judges are likely to be taken aback by the low level of ratio-
nal thinking exhibited by many defendants when faced with
these potentially life-altering decisions. Considering this
notion within a legal framework, the Supreme Court of the
United States held in Iowa v. Tovar47 that a waiver is intelligent
“when the defendant knows what he is doing and his choice is
made with eyes open.” A rhetorical but very real question is,
“How open?” To be fully open, levels #2, #3, and #4 must be
considered. To avoid being fully closed, #2 seems essential. For
the remaining levels, the necessary appreciation may have less
to do with accuracy than the underlying reasons for this belief.
Using #3 as an illustration, a female mentally disordered sus-
pect may correctly believe that her confession may result in an
“earthly” conviction but reason delusionally that she is exempt
from “earthly” powers.
Miranda reasoning should not be viewed as an all-or-nothing
process. Indeed, Blackwood and her colleagues48 found that the
large majority of defendants with markedly impaired reasoning
36. Id. at 22.
37. Id. Both modalities should be used: “The following is to be read and
explained by the officer, and the child shall read it before signing.”
38. Averages are derived from the database supporting RICHARD ROGERS,
KENNETH W. SEWELL, ERIC Y. DROGIN & CHELSEA E. FIDUCCIA, STAN-
DARDIZED ASSESSMENT OF MIRANDA ABILITIES (SAMA) PROFESSIONAL
MANUAL (2012).
39. See State v. Lanning, 5 Wash. App. 426, 487 P.2d 785 (1971), and
Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979). 
40. Richard Rogers, Chelsea E. Fiduccia, Emily V. Robinson, Jennifer
A. Steadham & Eric Y. Drogin, Investigating the Effects of Repeated
Miranda Warnings: Do They Perform a Curative Function on Common
Miranda Misconceptions? 31 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 397 (2013).
41. Id. Overall, 35 evidenced at least two fewer misconceptions,
whereas 55 showed no improvement at all, or even a worse perfor-
mance.
42. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986).  
43. Interestingly, in Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), the
Supreme Court of the United States appeared to de-emphasize the
intelligent prong in holding that a basic awareness was sufficient
for a valid Miranda waiver.
44. See ROGERS & DROGIN, supra note 1, at 93.
45. Thomas Grisso, The Competence of Adolescents as Trial Defendants,
3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 3 (1997).
46. Grisso and his colleagues also proposed a more elaborate model
with eight components. See Thomas Grisso, Paul S. Appelbaum,
Edward P. Mulvey & Kenneth Fletcher, The MacArthur Treatment
Competence Study II: Measures of Abilities Related to Competence to
Consent to Treatment, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 127 (1995).
47. Iowa v. Tovar, 124 S. Ct. 1379, 1387 (2004). 
48. Blackwood et al., supra note 14.
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49. ROGERS ET AL., supra note 38.
50. Id. The greatest concerns involved the benefits of waiving (45%)
or exercising (45%) the right to silence, plus the risk of waiving
the right to counsel (48%).
51. Id. Using a detection strategy known as the “performance curve,”
the SAMA Miranda Vocabulary Scale expects to find that defen-
dants will have much greater success at easier items than more dif-
ficult ones. Feigners often do not pay attention to item difficulty
when faking.
52. Richard Rogers, Emily V. Robinson & Sarah A. Henry, Feigning
Deficits in Legal Abilities: Development of Detection Strategies for the
SAMA and ILK, paper presented at the annual conference of the
American-Psychology Law Society, San Diego (March 2015).
53. JOSEPH C. HYNES, REPORT ON 102B: JUVENILE MIRANDA RIGHTS
(2010), www.abanet.org/crimjust/policy/midyear2010/102b.pdf.
54. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, RESOLUTION 102B: JUVENILE MIRANDA
RIGHTS (2010), www.abanet.org/crimjust/policy/midyear2010/
102b.pdf.
on some aspect of the Miranda waiver could still rationally con-
sider some short- and long-term consequences regarding other
aspects. For instance, they found most irrational thinking
involved the benefits of exercising rather than waiving Miranda
rights. For this article, we performed an additional analysis on
our extensive database of more than 600 pretrial defendants.49
As summarized in Table 1, relatively few defendants evidenced
substantially impaired reasoning for waiving or exercising
rights. The notable exception (14.4%) involved grossly misper-
ceived risks of requesting counsel. Examples include funda-
mental fallacies about affordability (e.g., no attorney without
the capacity to pay) or allegiance (e.g., court-appointed attor-
ney will divulge your admissions to the judge). Counsel may
wish to inquire, for example, “Why didn’t you ask for an attor-
ney immediately after being detained?  Why didn’t you ask for
an attorney immediately after hearing your Miranda warnings?”
Such questions may help to illuminate the defendant’s thinking
before the Miranda waiver.  
The picture becomes much more complex when irrational
and questionable reasoning are considered together. As a
benchmark, roughly 20% meet this combined category. When
this combined category is examined for defendants who have
been found incompetent to stand trial, the number nearly dou-
bles.50 Depending on other evidence, counsel may wish to rou-
tinely consider Miranda issues when competency to stand trial
is raised. In general, a major challenge facing defense counsel
and their retained experts is that many defendants are con-
fused about their memories around the time of the arrest due
to intoxication and severe situational stressors.
Issues of impaired Miranda reasoning are almost invariably
raised by defense counsel. Nonetheless, prosecutors as well as
judges have a strongly vested interest that only genuine cases
go forward. In addition to research on possibly feigned
Miranda vocabulary,51 Rogers and his colleagues are beginning
to examine whether defendants are evidencing a believable
pattern of Miranda misconceptions.52 These approaches can be
used to evaluate whether some defendants are falsely claiming
gross misconceptions in an intentional effort to suppress a
completely valid Miranda waiver. For example, a “Discrimina-
tion Index” was established based on which misconceptions
show remarkable deficits or moderate improvements when
defendants try to feign impaired Miranda reasoning.
A BLUEPRINT FOR IMPROVING MIRANDA WARNINGS
Citing earlier Miranda research,53 the American Bar Associ-
ation issued a policy statement to legislative bodies and gov-
ernmental agencies, asking for their constructive efforts
toward “the development of simplified Miranda warning lan-
guage for use with juvenile arrestees.”54 In our estimation, the
need for comprehensible warnings should have no age barri-
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TABLE 1: DEFENDANTS’ ABILITIES TO REASON ABOUT WAIVING AND EXERCISING THEIR MIRANDA RIGHTS
Percentages for Different Levels of Reasoning
WEIGHING OPTIONS SUBSTANTIALLY IMPAIRED REASONING
QUESTIONABLE
REASONING
RATIONAL: 
SHORT-TERMa
RATIONAL:
LONG-TERMb
Benefit of waiving
Silence 2.6 20.2 20.2 51.5
Counsel 4.7 13.1 13.1 55.8
Risk of waiving
Silence 5.1 14.3 14.3 47.1
Counsel 3.2 20.2 20.2 43.4
Benefit of exercising
Silence 2.9 20.2 20.2 46.6
Counsel 0.8 11.0 11.0 35.4
Risk of exercising
Silence 5.5 14.6 14.6 30.0
Counsel 14.6 10.6 10.6 47.4
a Considers immediate circumstances only. 
b Considers future consequences.
55. See Rogers, supra note 11, at 782.
56. See ROGERS & DROGIN, supra note 1.
57. Depending on the jurisdiction, judges may wish to avoid poten-
tially polarizing issues between defense and prosecution.  
ers. In 2008, Rogers55 called for the elimination of incompre-
hensible warnings, particularly those which he categorized as
the “worst offenders.” In their recent book, Mirandized State-
ments,56 Rogers and Drogin present tools on selecting simple
language for building effective Miranda warnings that can be
used with both juvenile and adult arrestees. They recommend
grassroot efforts to promote procedural justice involving the
key stakeholders, such as law enforcement, prosecutors,
defense attorneys—and, of course, judges.
Judges play a highly influential role in the American crimi-
nal-justice system. While they may not wish to become deeply
involved in the development of model Miranda warnings,57
they can still help to shape and improve current practices.
Toward this end, we offer a simplified blueprint that should
enable judges and their staff to facilitate simple yet effective
changes in the existing Miranda advisements.
Table 2 outlines the simple steps toward improving Miranda
warnings. For vocabulary, five simple steps could effectively
TABLE 2: BLUEPRINT FOR IMPROVING MIRANDA WARNINGS
STEPS ISSUES DETAILS/EXAMPLES
REMOVE DIFFICULT VOCABULARYa
1 Remove legalese
Examples: admissible, alleged, appearance, deposes, detain,
duress, entitled, executed, inadmissible, incriminate, know-
ingly, privilege, retain, revocation, statutory, stipulate, waive,
waiver
2 Remove formalized words Examples: aforementioned, hereinafter, hereby, pursuant,
whatsoever, whomsoever
3 Avoid homonyms (particularly
problematic for oral advisements)
Examples: admission, aggravated, charge, commitment, coun-
sel, execute, immunity, petition, terminate, waive
4 Avoid difficult words (10+ grade
reading level)
Examples: appointed, certify, coerce, coercion, compelled,
compulsion, counsel, discretionary, indigent, incompetent,
intimidation, invoke, leniency, pending, perjury, proceedings,
render, renounce, signify
5 Avoid infrequent words (less than
one word per million in writing)
Examples: certify, cross-examine, detain, discontinue, induce-
ment, initialed, interrogation
SHORTEN MIRANDA WARNINGSb
1 Component: Silence Less than 14 words
2 Component: Evidence against you Less than 16 words
3 Component: Attorney Less than 20 words
4 Component: Free legal services Less than 25 words
5 Component: Continuing rights Less than 23 words
6 Total warning Less than 56 wordsc
DECREASE READING-COMPREHENSION DEMANDSd
1 Component: Silence Flesch-Kincaid less than 4.2 grade level
2 Component: Evidence against you Flesch-Kincaid less than 6.9 grade level
3 Component: Attorney Flesch-Kincaid less than 4.5 grade level
4 Component: Free legal services Flesch-Kincaid less than 7.3 grade level
5 Component: Continuing rights Flesch-Kincaid less than 6.4 grade level
6 Total warning Flesch-Kincaid less than 6.4 grade level
a. Some words qualify for multiple categories. For simplicity, they are listed under the first applicable category. Vocabulary issues were distilled from Appen-
dixes A and B of ROGERS & DROGIN, supra note 1.
b. With warnings from 945 jurisdictions, these lengths represent the first quartile, with more than 200 variations found in general warnings. 
c. This number is based on the total words and does not equal the sum of each component.
d. With warnings from 945 jurisdictions, these reading grade levels represent the first quartile, with more than 200 variations found in general warnings.
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remove abstruse words that often confuse even the educated
public. 
Remove legalese: Simple words can easily be substituted for
words with specialized legal meanings, such as “admissible,”
“appearance,” “inadmissible,” “stipulate,” and “waiver.”
Remove formalized words: Some centuries-old formal words
are no longer used in common discourse. Examples include
“aforementioned” and “whomsoever.”
Remove homonyms: These words are particularly confusing
with oral Miranda warnings. Most defendants have heard “exe-
cute” and “terminate,” but many ascribe a very different mean-
ing to them than what is needed to accurately convey the
legally relevant information.
Remove difficult words. Some words clearly require close to a
high-school education or more before adults can even recog-
nize their correct meanings. Examples particularly relevant to
Miranda warnings include “indigent” and “proceedings.”
Remove infrequent words. Some words very rarely appear in
print; even if known, they can be barriers to a full understand-
ing of the sentence. Examples are “certify” and “interrogation.”
The second two components can be achieved easily, using
Microsoft Word or other major word-processing programs.
Word provides readability statistics—including word counts
and reading grade levels—almost instantly. The Flesch-Kincaid
reading-level estimate that the program generates is widely
accepted and used by many governmental agencies, including
the Department of Defense.58 As an important caution, its read-
ing levels are set for at least 75% comprehension;59 often sev-
eral more grades of reading ability are needed to ensure com-
plete comprehension.
The take-home message is very simple. With less than an
hour of unhurried work, the language of Miranda warnings
could be easily simplified. Equally simple would be the short-
ening of the Miranda warning and the marked reducing of its
reading demands to grade six or even lower. Remember, the
reading levels reported in Table 2 were found with several hun-
dred variations (i.e., the lowest quartile). With a more con-
certed effort, even lower grade levels are easily achievable. 
The blueprint for improving Miranda warnings could be
extended beyond local jurisdictions and considered at the
national level starting with Table 2 and supplemented by the
extensive guidelines60 in Rogers and Drogin. Building on the
ABA policy, the American Judges Association (AJA) could
adopt a more encompassing national policy with the attainable
goal of eliminating most incomprehensible warnings, irrespec-
tive of age or language.61 This policy would be consistent with
Miranda’s language calling for “clear and unequivocal” com-
munication of constitutional rights.62 Moreover, this policy
embraces the AJA’s overriding objective63 of being “dedicated
to improving the systems of justice in North America.” Sub-
stantiated with an AJA White Paper,64 a movement toward
national reform of Miranda warnings could be galvanized.
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Wrongful conviction is a serious dilemma for thecriminal-justice system. A joint investigation by theBetter Government Association and the Center on
Wrongful Convictions tracked exonerations from 1989
through 2010 and identified 85 people who were wrongfully
incarcerated.1 Not only were those 85 lives unfairly affected in
serious ways due to the incarceration, but the actual perpetra-
tors continued on crime sprees that went on to include 14
murders, 11 sexual assaults, 10 kidnappings, and at least 62
other felonies.2
The reversal of false convictions is becoming more frequent.3
However, scholars have asserted that the exonerations that do
occur are probably a small fraction of actual wrongful convic-
tions. Gross and colleagues pointed out that “[o]ur legal system
places great weight on the finality of criminal convictions.
Courts and prosecutors are exceedingly reluctant to reverse
judgments or reconsider closed cases; when they do—and it’s
rare—it’s usually because of a compelling showing of error.”4
Therefore, in order for a wrongful conviction to be overturned,
these cases must undergo a lengthy appeals process. 
WRONGFUL CONVICTION CAUSAL FACTORS
To prevent wrongful convictions, it is important to under-
stand the factors that lead to them. In one study of 86 DNA-
exoneration cases, the leading factors contributing to wrongful
conviction were eyewitness misidentification (71% of the
cases), errors in forensic-science testing (63% of the cases),
police misconduct (44% of the cases), prosecutorial miscon-
duct (28% of the cases), false and misleading expert testimony
by forensic experts (27% of the cases), dishonest informants
and incompetent defense representation (both 19% of the
cases), and false confessions (17% of the cases).5 According to
a more recent analysis by The Innocence Project (2015), which
examined 325 post-conviction DNA exonerations in the
United States, the following errors were identified: eyewitness-
misidentification testimony (72% of cases), unvalidated or
improper forensic science (47% of cases), false
confessions/incriminating statements (27% of cases), and
informants or snitches (15% of cases).6 Based on these data, it
is apparent that there is an array of causal factors related to
wrongful convictions. 
Eyewitness misidentification. Wrongful-conviction
research has established that eyewitness identifications are
widely considered to be one of the least reliable forms of evi-
dence admitted in the courtroom.7 In one study of 500 cases of
erroneous convictions, the leading cause of mistaken convic-
tion was faulty eyewitness identification of defendants.8 Since
DNA testing became available in criminal cases in the 1990s,
hundreds of defendants who were convicted by United States
juries have been exonerated by exculpatory DNA evidence.9
Out of these people, 235 were cases of mistaken eyewitness
identification.10 Despite clear limitations, many legal decision
makers view eyewitness testimony as very persuasive. As eye-
witness testimony is the leading cause of wrongful convictions,
decision makers should consider the existing scientific knowl-
edge pertaining to the shortcomings of eyewitness testimony
when considering facts of criminal cases that involve eyewit-
nesses.11
Error in forensic-science testing. Forensic science (e.g.,
latent fingerprints and hair analysis) is often portrayed as a
gold standard of evidence since it is widely thought of as
unquestionable physical proof of one’s innocence or guilt.
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DNA evidence specifically has been referred to as a “truth
machine.”12 However, forensic-science error has led to wrong-
ful convictions in several cases. Whether it is laboratory fraud
or fabricated evidence, these erroneous methods are especially
troubling since scientific evidence is often the primary method
prosecutors use to prove a defendant’s guilt. In a study of the
trial transcripts of 137 exonerees, 13 cases involved either a
failure to disclose exculpatory data or analysis or fabrication of
forensic evidence.13
Police misconduct. In a study of 62 exonerations, police
misconduct was found in 50% of the cases.14 Common forms
of misconduct by police included employing suggestion when
conducting identification procedures, coercing false confes-
sions, lying or intentionally misleading jurors about their
observations, failing to turn over exculpatory evidence to pros-
ecutors, losing or destroying evidence, and providing incen-
tives to secure unreliable evidence from informants.15 Because
there is pressure on police officers to obtain incriminating evi-
dence against a suspect in the absence of alternate inculpatory
evidence, police may be “tempted to cut corners . . . perhaps to
manufacture evidence to clinch the case.”16
Expert Testimony. Experts may be held in a generally high
regard based on the witness’s credential or some other relevant
factor.17 In fact, because juries may give special weight to
forensic-science expert testimony,18 the U.S. Supreme Court
cautioned, “[e]xpert evidence can be both powerful and quite
misleading because of the difficulty in evaluating it.”19 A study
by Garrett and Neufeld found that in 60% of their sample of
wrongful-conviction cases, forensic analysts called by the pros-
ecution provided invalid testimony.20 Additionally, experts
sometimes testify regarding forensic-science practices (e.g.,
hair microscopy, bite-mark comparison) that, while practiced
for years, have not been subjected to adequate scientific
research.21 While forensic science often provides exonerating
information, the misuse of this evidence can have deleterious
implications as well. 
False confessions. Despite being implicated in 20% to
25% of wrongful convictions in DNA-exoneration cases in
the United States, confession evidence has been historically
regarded as a “gold standard” of evidence in court.22 How-
ever, of the 340 exonerations between 1989 and 2004, 51
defendants, or 15%, confessed to crimes they did not com-
mit.23 Most of these confessions were coerced by the police.
False confessions are heavily concentrated among the most
vulnerable populations—people with mental disabilities and
people under the age of 18. Of the false confessors in Gross
et al.’s study, 55% of them were either under 18, intellectually
disabled, or both.24 Research conducted by Kassin, Bogart,
and Kerner25 suggested that confessions may exert influence
in addition to the actual admission of guilt in trial. Specifi-
cally, incriminating confessions can mislead the perceptions
of lay witnesses, expert witnesses, and jurors. For example,
research has found that confessions influence verdicts even
when the confessor is reportedly mentally ill or when the
confessor was noted to be under duress when confessing.26
Furthermore, Kassin et al. found that multiple errors were
more likely to exist in wrongful-conviction cases containing
a confession.27 In such cases containing multiple errors, con-
fessions were more likely to have been obtained first rather
than later in the investigation. This temporal-order finding is
important because it suggests confessions taint other forms of
evidence. 
JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING
While judicial decision making is ostensibly guided by legal
factors, public policy and other influences often converge to
shape judicial decisions.28 Ideological factors as well as policy
preferences increasingly influence decision making as one
moves higher up the judicial “pyramid.”29 Although a growing
body of research has investigated the use of expert testimony
in jury decisions, little is known about how judges evaluate
scientific or psychological evidence in the decision-making
process.30 It has been indicated that some judges may be more
likely to disregard social-science evidence because it may repu-
Court Review - Volume 51 159
31. Richard E. Redding & N. Dickon Reppucci, Effects of Lawyers’
Socio-Political Attitudes on Their Judgments of Social Science in
Legal Decision Making, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 31, 32 (1999).
32. Kovera & McAuliff, supra note 30, at 575.
33. Robert J. Ramsey & James Frank, Wrongful Conviction: Perceptions
of Criminal Justice Professionals Regarding the Frequency of Wrong-
ful Conviction and the Extent of System Errors, 53 CRIME & DELINQ.
436, 455-56 (2007).
34. Id. at 456.
35. Id. at 461.
36. Neil Vidmar, The Psychology of Trial Judging, 20 CURRENT DIREC-
TIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 58, 58 (2011).
37. See Redding & Reppucci, supra note 31, at 47.
38. (M = 13.35, SD = 8.23)
39. Special jurisdictions are also referred to as “limited jurisdictions,”
and both terms were referenced in the survey.
40. (M = 17.43%, SD = 20.09)
41. (M = 5.33, SD = 7.66)
42. Lissa Griffin, The Correction of Wrongful Convictions: A Compara-
tive Perspective, 16 AMER. UNIV. INT’L. L. REV. 1241, 1246 (2001).
diate their (more conservative) sociopolitical beliefs.31 Fur-
thermore, research suggests that without additional training,
some judges may be less able to assess the validity of scientific
and psychological evidence accurately.32 This has several
implications for judges’ ability to interpret expert and eyewit-
ness testimony and be effective gatekeepers of forensic-science
and social-science evidence.  
For the most part, it is relatively unknown how judges per-
ceive the errors that commonly lead to convictions of innocent
defendants. In a survey conducted by Ramsey and Frank inves-
tigating criminal-justice professionals’ perceptions of the fre-
quency of wrongful convictions and system errors, judges indi-
cated beliefs that each system error occurred less frequently
than defense attorneys believed it occurred.33 Judge percep-
tions were more in line with police chiefs and prosecutors than
defense attorneys.34 In addition, survey responses indicated
criminal-justice professionals (i.e., defense counsel, police,
prosecutors, and judges) were least likely to acknowledge error
concerning corrupt actions, specifically police using false evi-
dence and prosecutors knowingly using false evidence. This
may reflect the fact that respondents are more likely to recog-
nize issues concerning negligence and poor training than
issues involving corruption within the system.35 While studies
such as this do ultimately shed some light on judges’ percep-
tions of factors leading to wrongful convictions, there is still
much to be learned regarding judicial decision making in
wrongful-conviction cases.   
THE PRESENT STUDY
Judicial decision making may be subject to the influence of
many different factors, including the judge’s attitudes, past
experiences, policy preferences, and opinion of scientific evi-
dence.36 The present study contributes to courtroom research
by examining demographics and perceptions of trial errors and
scientific evidence associated with the propensity to grant a
writ of habeas corpus.
We expected that judges would be more likely to grant the
writ of habeas corpus when confronted with errors in forensic-
science evidence contributing to a wrongful conviction over
errors in social-science evidence. This hypothesis is consistent
with past research documenting judicial and law-student par-
ticipants’ generally negative or dismissive attitudes about
social-science evidence.37 In an exploratory manner, we inves-
tigate which trial errors judges would place greatest impor-
tance on in their decision making. Finally, it was hypothesized
that judges’ attitudes toward different types of scientific evi-
dence (i.e., social science and forensic science) in the court-
room would influence granting of a new trial. 
METHOD
PARTICIPANTS
Participants were 308 judges with an average of approxi-
mately 13 years of experience each.38 The sample included 70
females (22.7% of the sample) and 238 males (77.3% of the
sample). Most judges reported being between the ages of 45
and 64 (75.4%), with others between 35 and 44 (7.1%), 65 and
74 (16.6%), and over 75 (1%). Most reported being Caucasian
(94.0%), while others reported being black or African-Ameri-
can (1.7%), Asian or Asian-American (1.7%), Hispanic or
Latin American (1.3%), or from another racial or ethnic back-
ground (3.3%). There was at least one participant from each
U.S. state, the District of Columbia, the Northern Mariana
Islands, and the Virgin Islands. The judicial sample comprised
judges from the following regions of jurisdiction: 32.1% of
judges presided in the West, 27.6% presided in the Midwest,
6.5% presided in the Northeast, 33.1% presided in the South,
and 0.6% presided in island territories. 
In the sample, 69.4% of judges served general jurisdictions,
while 5.5% served appellate, 22.8% served special,39 and 2.3%
served military jurisdictions. As a whole, judges estimated they
had presided over between 17 and 18 cases that had been
involved in the appeals process over the duration of their
careers thus far.40 The judges reported a range of experience
with cases over which they had presided that had been over-
turned on appeal, with an average of approximately five over-
turned cases.41
MEASURES 
Vignette. Judges were presented with one of two vignettes;
one included social-science evidence and the other, forensic-
science evidence. The vignettes contained three different evi-
dentiary issues related to the causal factors of wrongful con-
victions. All vignettes first presented system-corruption evi-
dence (i.e., held constant across conditions as a rationale to
raise the appeal process). There were then two variables from
one of the scientific-evidence categories (i.e., forensic or social
science). The vignettes’ presentation order of scientific eviden-
tiary issues were counterbalanced, with the system-corruption
issue always presented first and a counterbalanced variation of
the two scientific-evidence variables presented second and
third. Because post-conviction review is often focused on the
correction of legal and procedural errors, as opposed to factual
errors,42 judges were presented with the system-corruption
evidentiary issue (i.e., police misconduct) first, as it was poten-
tially more likely to be considered a legal error worthy of inves-
tigation that might then lead to judges’ further consideration of
additional factual errors (e.g., false confession, inaccurate
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expert testimony). The system-error evidence pertained to
causal factors of false convictions involving corrupt action by
form of police misconduct. The police-misconduct vignette
was as follows: 
Mr. Adam’s co-worker told the police that she was
with him on the night of the murder during the time that
the crime allegedly took place. However, law enforce-
ment officials never added this evidence to their police
report and it was never mentioned during trial, as it was
never turned over to the prosecutors. 
The evidentiary issues relating to social-science evidence
included evidence of a false confession and of an eyewitness
misidentification. These types of evidence fall under the
defined domain of social-science evidence in line with social-
psychological research on mechanisms and impacts involved
in false confessions and eyewitness misidentification.43 The
eyewitness-testimony vignette was as follows:
Mr. Williams testified at the original trial that he wit-
nessed what he believed to be Mr. Adams fleeing the
scene of the crime on the night of the murder. The eye-
witness stated that as he was leaving his friend’s house,
he heard a commotion in an alleyway and saw who
appeared to be Mr. Adams running and jumping over a
fence. When he heard about the murder on the news a
few days later, he went into the police station and told
them what he believes he saw. The underlying facts
regarding the identification procedure at the station
were never presented to the jury. First, at the time Mr.
Williams witnessed the perpetrator flee, it was late, dark,
and he had been drinking. He told the officers this and
they asked him to try his hardest to pick the perpetrator
from a lineup to the best of his ability, as they knew how
compelling an eyewitness would be to the jury during
the trial. When he stated he was unsure who the perpe-
trator was upon viewing the lineup, an officer asked if
he would take a few more minutes to consider who they
suspected committed the crime (Mr. Adams). The offi-
cers reminded him a few more times how important his
testimony would be to the case and reassured him that
they were already quite sure who had committed the
crime. Eventually, Mr. Williams picked out the suspect
from the lineup after recognizing that he had a similar
facial structure and facial hair to the man he witnessed
fleeing the scene of the crime. 
The false-confession vignette was as follows:
The prosecuting attorney presented evidence to the
court at the original trial that Mr. Adams confessed to
raping and murdering Mrs. Jones. The circumstances
behind the coerced confession included the following.
Mr. Adams was interrogated by police detectives for sev-
eral hours, after which they deployed deception to elicit
his confession. Specifically, they told him they had solid
incriminating evidence that he committed the crime in
the form of fingerprints on the murder weapon. How-
ever, this was untrue. At the arrival of his lawyer and
upon learning that there was no such fingerprint evi-
dence, Mr. Adams recanted the confession. The confes-
sion evidence played a large role in the prosecutor’s case
against Mr. Adams, and he was eventually convicted and
sentenced to 50 years to life in prison.
The evidentiary issues presented in the forensic-science
vignette were derived from real cases described by Garret and
Neufeld44 in their study examining trial transcripts for invalid
forensic-science testimony. The inaccurate-expert-testimony
vignette was as follows:
An expert from the local crime lab testified during the
trial regarding a serology analysis his lab conducted. In
this case, the victim, Mrs. Jones, and the suspect, Mr.
Adams, are both B secretors. B substances were found on
the victim’s underwear, which could have been entirely
from the victim. However, the analyst testified stating
that the donor would have had to have been a B secretor.
In addition, A antigens were found on another stain in
the victim’s underwear that were foreign to both the sus-
pect and the victim, but the analyst failed to exclude Mr.
Adams as the source stating to the court that the foreign
substance could be a mixture of blood, sweat, wood,
leather, and detergents or other substances, indicating
that the suspect should not be ruled out based on this
evidence. 
The faulty-laboratory-procedure vignette was as follows:
A private forensic laboratory’s analyst reportedly
failed to detect semen on the victim’s underwear so that
no testing could be done to either include or exclude Mr.
Adams. However, a post-conviction on-the-spot DNA
test later showed a positive result for the presence of
semen on that exact spot that should not have been
missed previously. Subsequent DNA testing on the spot
will provide evidence lending to the innocence of the
suspect. 
Vignette-related factors and outcomes. Judges answered
questions after each evidentiary issue was presented. After the
first piece of evidence (i.e., system error/police misconduct)
was presented, the judges were asked to consider the piece of
evidence and rate how likely they would be to grant a new trial
on a scale of 1 to 10. Following the presentation of the entire
vignette (i.e., either all forensic or all social-science evidence),
judges made final decisions as to the likelihood of granting a
new trial (using the scalar item), as well as whether or not they
would grant a writ of habeas corpus in dichotomous format.
Therefore, the items included a dichotomous “yes”/“no” ques-
tion addressing this decision (used for ecological-validity pur-
poses) and a continuous version of the question asking, “How
likely are you to grant the writ on a scale of 1 to 10?” 
An opinion portion of the questionnaire followed the deci-
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sion, where the judges were asked to rate how important each
evidence variable was in their decision-making process. They
rated the importance of each trial error on a scalar rating, with
1 being “Not at all” and 10 being “Very much so.” Participat-
ing judges also indicated which evidentiary issue presented in
the vignette was most influential in their decision regarding
whether to grant a new trial, as well as which evidentiary issue
was least influential. 
Scientific Evidence in Court Attitudes Questionnaire.
After the decision-making portion of the survey was complete,
judges responded to 36 items related to beliefs and attitudes
about scientific evidence. Eighteen items pertained to social
science in a courtroom context, and the remaining 18 items
concerned forensic science in the courtroom. For example, a
social-science item stated, “The subjectivity of social science
causes me to question its value in the courtroom.” A forensic-
science item stated, “Forensic science expert witnesses have
been known to exaggerate their findings to benefit the side for
whom they are testifying.” The items were derived from issues
discussed in a variety of sources, including amicus briefs,
research articles, court cases, and The Innocence Project.45
Judges were asked to rate the extent to which they agreed with
the 36 items. They responded on a 10-point scale, with 1 being
“Not at all” and 10 being “Very much so.”
PROCEDURE
Questionnaires were distributed to judges through Survey-
Monkey, a survey-hosting website. Participating judges were
contacted through a National Judicial College electronic mail-
ing list. Before answering items on the questionnaire, a brief
consent form explained the rights and risks of the participants
that are involved in the research study. If consenting, the par-
ticipants were directed to the remainder of the questionnaire.
The versions of the vignettes (i.e., social science or forensic sci-
ence) presented to the participants were randomly assigned
through a logic function in SurveyMonkey. Of the participating
judges, 48.7% received the social-science vignette, and 51.3%
received the forensic-science vignette.  
FINDINGS
PRELIMINARY ANALYSES
A total of 279 out of 308 judges (90.5%) ultimately granted
the writ of habeas corpus. Of the judges in the forensic-science
condition, 92.4% ultimately granted the writ of habeas corpus.
In the social-science condition, 88.7% of the judges ultimately
granted the writ of habeas corpus. Other than gender, no
demographic variables showed significant effects on ultimate
decisions regarding granting a writ of habeas corpus.46 Results
indicated that gender of the judge was fairly influential on
judges’ decisions regarding how likely they were to grant the
writ.47 Specifically, females48 reported a somewhat higher like-
lihood of granting the writ than males.49 Similarly, the ultimate
dichotomous decision regarding whether to grant the writ dif-
fered by gender,50 where females more often indicated they
would grant the writ of habeas corpus (97.1%) in comparison
to males (88.7%). 
DOES THE TYPE OF SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE PRE-
SENTED IN THE VIGNETTE CONTRIBUTE TO THE
JUDGES’ DECISIONS REGARDING GRANTING A WRIT
OF HABEAS CORPUS?
We conducted a logistic regression to evaluate what type of
evidence would most influence the decision to grant the writ
of habeas corpus. A logistic regression allows the prediction of
categorical outcomes (i.e., yes or no) with two or more cate-
gories. Therefore, a logistic regression was utilized to deter-
mine the influence of the different types of evidence presented
to judges on their ultimate decision to grant the writ (i.e., yes
or no). This model also included gender to evaluate its role on
decisions to grant a writ. While the overall group of predictors
was significant,51 only gender influenced the decision to grant
the writ in this instance.52
Results of the current study collectively suggest that female
judges were consistently more likely to grant the writ than
male judges, even when couched in the context of restricted
ranges of overall sample responses. Of note, existing research
on judges and gender found sentencing disparities involving
the gender of the defendant.53 Specifically, it was found that
female offenders receive more lenient sentences by male judges
and that male offenders are punished more harshly regardless
of the gender of the judge.54 Adding to the literature on gen-
der-difference theories in a judicial context, gender differences
in judicial decision making have been found in sex-discrimi-
nation cases. Specifically, it was found that male and female
judges utilize distinct approaches in these types of cases, with
the probability of female judges ruling in favor of the plaintiff
10% more often than when the judge is male.55 Additionally,
research findings indicated that the presence of a female judge
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on a panel of judges increases the likelihood of a male judge
ruling in favor of the plaintiff by 12% to 14%.56 In other words,
“the presence of a female on a panel actually causes male
judges to vote in a way they otherwise would not.”57 A plausi-
ble explanation for gender differences in granting the writ may
be found in research on the construct of authoritarianism.
Some studies have found that males tend to be higher in
authoritarianism than women.58 Research has suggested that
individuals higher in authoritarianism may assign harsh pun-
ishment, be tougher on offenders, and be more likely to rec-
ommend conviction.59 Therefore, perhaps male judges, who
may be more likely to be high in authoritarianism, are less
likely to consider the possibility of potentially releasing a pre-
viously convicted offender, even when confronted with per-
suasive proof of error. This finding demonstrates an area for
further research to better understand potential gender differ-
ences among judges.
We conducted an analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) to
examine the relationship between the likelihood of granting a
writ of habeas corpus depending on vignette condition, con-
trolling for gender. The overall model displayed a significant
effect on likelihood of granting the writ.60 Both type of evi-
dence61 and gender62 contributed to judges’ decisions regard-
ing how likely they were to grant the writ. Results indicated
participants in the forensic-science condition63 were more
likely to grant the writ (i.e., assign higher likelihood ratings)
than those in the social-science condition.64
When asked what evidence presented in court is generally
more influential on their decision-making process, 0.6% of
judges indicated psychological evidence such as eyewitness
misidentifications and false confessions; 61.4% indicated
forensic-science evidence such as serology, fingerprints, and
DNA evidence; and 38% reported that they do not think one
type of evidence is more influential than the other. Further,
when asked which type of expert testimony they generally
found more credible, 0.6% of judges indicated social-science
testimony, 76% indicated forensic-science testimony, and
23.4% reported that they do not find one generally more cred-
ible than the other. Figure 1 demonstrates these preferences. 
Judges indicated which evidentiary issues were most and
least influential to their decision regarding granting the writ of
habeas corpus. Table 1 provides a breakdown of their
responses for both the forensic-science- and social-science-
vignette conditions. 
Judicial consideration of police misconduct (i.e., the first
piece of evidence presented to the judges) is of particular
importance to the wrongful-conviction literature.65 Of all evi-
dentiary issues presented, police misconduct accounted for the
greatest amount of variance in granting the writ across vignette
conditions, suggesting judges place considerably high empha-
sis on criminal-justice-system errors. 
Among the judges in the forensic-science condition, the
likelihood of granting the writ of habeas corpus depended on
the importance ratings that judges associated with the three
different evidentiary issues: police misconduct, faulty labora-
tory procedure, and inaccurate expert testimony. With regard
to a mistake made in a forensic laboratory, the results sug-
gested that once the judges were presented with evidence of
faulty laboratory procedure, the more they valued that evi-
dence, the more likely they were to grant the writ of habeas
corpus. This finding indicates that the importance associated
with this type of error played a significant role in the judicial
decision-making process. Seeing an error made in a forensic-
science laboratory may have served as an eye-opening
reminder to judges that forensic science is not always unques-
tionable physical proof of guilt or innocence. Therefore, many
judges seemed to consider a mistake made with this generally
accepted and trustworthy evidence to be an important factor in
the appeals process. 
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TABLE 1
INFLUENTIAL EVIDENTIARY ISSUES FOR FORENSIC-SCIENCE
AND SOCIAL-SCIENCE CONDITIONS
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79. (Bartlett’s Test, (χ2 [153] = 2,060.81, p < .001))
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In the social-science condition, the judges’ likelihood of
granting the writ depended on the importance ratings of two
different trial errors: eyewitness misidentification and police
misconduct. The perceived importance of a false confession
did not impact judges’ likelihood to grant the writ of habeas
corpus. In fact, 62% of the judges named the false-confession
evidence as the least influential evidentiary error presented to
them. This finding is consistent with mock-jury research that
has found that even when people decide that a confession was
coerced or involuntary,66 or when they say the confession evi-
dence does not influence their decisions,67 individuals do not
appropriately discount confession evidence. Therefore, per-
haps some judges simply are less likely to acknowledge that
false confessions occur or are problematic in the first place.   
The importance of eyewitness identification was the only
social-science evidentiary issue that affected judges’ likelihood
of granting a new trial. It appears judges place a value on such
evidence that is in line with the high frequency with which
eyewitness misidentifications have occurred in actual exonera-
tion cases.68 Judges may be more likely to perceive eyewitness
misidentification as an important and influential trial error due
to judges’ responsibility for preventing and minimizing effects
of eyewitness errors in the United States court system.69 Specif-
ically, the quintessential responsibility judges hold in facilitat-
ing the prevention and identification of erroneous eyewitness
testimony70 may lend itself to explain why judges’ perceived
importance regarding eyewitness error successfully predicted
the likelihood to grant a writ of habeas corpus.
DO ATTITUDES PERTAINING TO SCIENTIFIC EVI-
DENCE, SPECIFICALLY EITHER SOCIAL SCIENCE OR
FORENSIC SCIENCE, INFLUENCE JUDICIAL DECISION
MAKING REGARDING GRANTING A WRIT OF HABEAS
CORPUS? 
To develop items for the forensic-science-attitudes scales,
an exploratory-factor-analysis (EFA) procedure was performed
to retain only factors that are maximally representative of
judges’ attitudes pertaining to scientific evidence.71 After sev-
eral analyses were run, which produced suboptimal results due
to issues with some of the items and the model, a forced two-
factor EFA model utilizing all but two of the items from the
Attitudes Regarding Forensic Scientific Evidence Scale (due to
a general lack of fit with the other items) was run, which sug-
gested meaningful72 and correlated73 relationships among fac-
tors. Nine of the 16 remaining items were related to factor 1,74
and six items were related to a second factor.75 Item 3 was
dropped due to lack of conceptual fit on either factor.
From these results, it can be concluded that two underlying
sub-components exist, namely, Negative Attitudes Regarding
Forensic-Science Evidence (factor 1)76 and Positive Attitudes
Regarding Forensic-Science Evidence (factor 2).77 Factor 1
comprises items suggesting beliefs that forensic-science evi-
dence is flawed, biased, or lacks validity and reliability. Sample
items include “Forensic science can produce errors that con-
tribute to wrongful convictions” and “Forensic science tech-
niques lack adequate reliability and validity.” Conversely, fac-
tor 2 includes items that refer to beliefs about the infallibility
of forensic-science evidence. Items correspond with beliefs
that forensic-science evidence is objective, not likely to be
biased by experts, and rarely inadmissible in court. Sample
items include “Forensic science is the most important evidence
presented during a criminal court proceeding” and “Opposing
experts are less likely to disagree about forensic science evi-
dence in court.” 
An EFA procedure was performed including the scores of
the items in the Attitudes Regarding Social Scientific Evidence
Scale. The EFA results, including all 18 items of the Attitudes
Regarding Social Scientific Evidence Scale, suggested meaning-
ful78 and correlated79 relationships among factors. Results of
the EFA suggested one factor. Four items (7, 9, 10, and 14)
were removed due to insufficient factor loading, yielding a 14-
item, single-factor model.80
From these results, it was concluded that one underlying
sub-component exists, namely, Negative Attitudes Regarding
Social Science Evidence (factor 1).81 This scale comprises
items suggesting that social-science evidence is biased, is not
applicable to the real world, and should be inadmissible in
court. Sample items include “Social science evidence is easily
manipulated to favor either side in a trial” and “Most fact find-
ers have difficulties assessing the quality of social science evi-
dence.” 
Repeated-measures General Linear Modeling was used to
test the combined effects of judges’ ratings before and after
being presented with all pieces of evidence, judges’ gender, and
their attitudes regarding scientific evidence. This type of analy-
sis allowed the investigators in the study to compare variables’
impacts on the outcome (i.e., likelihood to grant the writ) both
before and after certain evidentiary issues were introduced,
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while comparing results by different group variables, such as
gender and vignette condition (i.e., social science vs. forensic
science). Within the forensic-science-vignette subsample, no
significant effects were observed. Within the social-science-
vignette subsample, the main effect of the pre-post writ rating
remained significant.82 Participants were significantly more
likely to grant the writ after considering all scientific errors83
than after viewing police corruption only.84 No additional sig-
nificant effects were observed. 
Data from several analyses suggest a pattern of judges pre-
ferring forensic science over social science. Therefore, it seems
possible that judges value forensic-science evidence (even
errors pertaining to forensic-science evidence) more than they
value social-science evidence. These findings are consistent
with previous literature that has explored why courts seem to
ignore relevant social-science research85 or reject social-science
evidence.86 The current study builds upon Redding and Rep-
pucci’s findings where many judges indicated a distrust of
social science, particularly experts who testify in court regard-
ing social science.87
EXPLORATORY ANALYSES
The Attitudes Regarding Scientific Evidence scales were
tested for their direct impact on the dichotomous judicial deci-
sion regarding granting a writ of habeas corpus. Logistic
regression was employed for examination of both Attitudes
Regarding Forensic and Social Scientific Evidence, predicting
the ultimate dichotomous writ decision when controlling for
participant gender and vignette condition. 
The set of predictors displayed a significant effect on the
dichotomous writ decision;88 the model also displayed ade-
quate fit.89 Of the Attitudes Regarding Scientific Evidence sub-
scales, only Positive Attitudes Regarding Forensic-Science Evi-
dence90 and Negative Attitudes Regarding Social-Science Evi-
dence91 showed significant effects. The odds ratio suggests that
as positive attitudes regarding forensic-science evidence
increase, the odds of the judges granting the writ of habeas cor-
pus increase as well. In addition, as negative attitudes regard-
ing social-science evidence increase, the odds of the judges
granting the writ of habeas corpus decrease. 
Supplemental logistic-regression analyses were conducted
to evaluate whether the effects of Attitudes Regarding Scien-
tific Evidence scores on the dichotomous writ decision varied
by vignette subsample. Identical regression parameters were
retained from the previous analysis. For judges in the foren-
sic-science-vignette condition, the set of predictors displayed
a significant effect on whether or not they ultimately granted
the writ of habeas corpus;92 the model also displayed ade-
quate fit.93 Similar to the findings from the larger overall sam-
ple, only Positive Attitudes Regarding Forensic Science94 and
Negative Attitudes Regarding Social Science95 displayed sig-
nificant effects. Odds ratios indicated that as positive atti-
tudes regarding forensic-science evidence increase, so do
odds of judges granting the writ of habeas corpus. Further, as
negative attitudes regarding social science increase, judges’
odds of granting the writ decrease. For judges in the social-
science-vignette condition, the set of predictors did not dis-
play a significant effect on whether or not they ultimately
granted the writ of habeas corpus;96 the model also displayed
adequate fit.97
Consistent with Redding and Reppucci’s finding that
judges’ general attitudes about the use of social science in law
correlate with specific judgments,98 results of the current
study suggest that judges’ attitudes toward scientific evidence
predicted whether judges would ultimately grant the writ of
habeas corpus using the dichotomous-outcome variable (i.e.,
yes or no). This finding is particularly relevant to judicial
decision making, as the judges’ dichotomous decision is exter-
nally valid and more applicable to the kinds of decisions
judges typically make in court. The results indicate that the
more positive attitudes regarding forensic science and the less
negative attitudes regarding social science, the more likely
judges were to grant the writ. This could point to potential
biasing factors regarding how judicial decision makers feel
about science. Furthermore, when broken down by subsam-
ple, only judges who received the forensic-science vignette
were significantly affected by their attitudes when making the
dichotomous decision. 
Because these results suggest judges are less likely to change
their attitudes, it seems system reform is a viable option to rec-
tify errors involving scientific evidence. According to Haney, lit-
tle widespread and lasting legal change results from psychologi-
cal testimony regarding these errors.99 Instead, Haney advises
working toward concrete changes within the legal system by
seeking improvements to mandatory jury instruction or changes
to the rules of evidence.100 The Innocence Project, in conjunc-
tion with the National Academy of Sciences, recommends the
creation of an independent federal entity that would seek to con-
duct comprehensive research and evaluation within the forensic
sciences to establish validated standards and consistent applica-
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tions of forensic techniques nationwide.101 Widely enforced sci-
entific standards, in combination with judicial training regard-
ing complex scientific evidence, could significantly assist judges
in making important legal decisions within the justice system.
Ultimately, if the frequency of these errors is reduced, not only
would the number of wrongful convictions eventually decrease,
but the justice system’s time and financial resources would be
saved as well, as fewer efforts would be wasted in rectifying these
errors in the first place. 
CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS
Overall, results indicated the following factors played a part
in judges’ decisions regarding granting a writ of habeas corpus:
gender of the judge, forensic- versus social-science-vignette
condition, and the perceived importance of certain evidentiary
issues (i.e., faulty laboratory procedure, police misconduct,
inaccurate expert testimony, and eyewitness misidentification).
Additionally, attitudes regarding social and forensic scientific
evidence differentially predicted the decision of whether judges
would ultimately grant the writ of habeas corpus.
IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY AND TRAINING
Present findings point to the need for greater awareness
among criminal-justice professionals regarding the many dif-
ferent types of procedural or evidentiary errors existent in
wrongful-conviction cases. In light of present findings and pre-
vious research, training for judges may include information
regarding frequency and potential consequences of common
procedural and evidentiary errors, the scientific method and
how it relates to the types of evidence potentially presented in
court, validity and reliability of scientific analyses and tech-
niques often presented in the courtroom, and management of
threats to objectivity.
The particular importance of judge education is high-
lighted, specifically regarding how often some of these trial
errors occur in actuality, because it may be the case that some
judges are underestimating the prevalence of such errors and,
as a result, are overlooking their possible contribution to
wrongful convictions. For example, many judges seemed to
disregard evidence of a false confession in the current study,
and yet in 27% of actual DNA exonerations, innocent defen-
dants made incriminating statements, pled guilty, or falsely
confessed.102 Furthermore, to reduce the prevalence of wrong-
ful convictions in the first place, the results of the current
study support the continuation of scientific-evidence training
among judges. Fong, Krantz, and Nisbett found that individ-
uals who underwent brief training in methodological reason-
ing provided more scientifically sophisticated solutions to a
series of real-world problems.103 Therefore, judges may be
able to reason in an increasingly methodologically sophisti-
cated manner after brief training, and as a result, they may
also be better “able to scrutinize the quality of expert evidence
more systematically and thus make better informed deci-
sions.”104
For several decades, judges have been receiving training on
scientific methods through judicial-education conferences and
seminars, as well as through entities like the National Judicial
College, the Federal Judicial Center, and the Agency for Sci-
ence, Technology, and Research. Nevertheless, although educa-
tion has been available, it generally has not been treated as a
core component of judges’ curricula. Future training, available
to judges in all levels of courts and jurisdictions through work-
shops and webinars, should focus on how social and forensic
scientific evidence can inform judicial decisions. 
Due to the often-complicated nature of scientific evidence
in the courtroom, it is of vital importance that judges under-
stand the complexities of the evidence to perform the gate-
keeping aspect of their jobs responsibly.105 Regrettably, judges
might sometimes find themselves in a position to evaluate
rather convoluted materials without specialized training or
expertise on the subject. Therefore, in addition to scientific-
methodology training, judges should be informed as to the
reliability, validity, and conformance to Daubert principles of
different social-science measures as well as forensic-science
techniques.106 They should be aware of which techniques have
not been subjected to rigorous scientific evaluation (i.e., hair
microscopy, bite-mark comparisons, tool-mark analysis), so
that they can make well-informed gatekeeping decisions.
Accordingly, a National Institute of Justice research report pro-
duced by representatives from practice, academia, and other
relevant areas suggested the following potentially needed areas
of judicial education: “the basics of a given science . . . regula-
tions for expert presentations, and resources for determining
when science is conclusive.”107
While understanding the science presented in court is of
utmost importance, it is possible that judges would benefit
from objectivity training as well. As pointed out by Smith and
Blumberg, “The judge . . . can only strive to minimize the emo-
tional, the idiosyncratic elements in his intellectual processes,
but cannot eliminate them altogether.”108 Therefore, consider-
ing our results suggesting that judicial decision making could
potentially be compromised by preferences and opinions
regarding scientific evidence, training should also address
plausible techniques in detecting and managing threats to
objectivity. While biases and opinions cannot be removed
entirely, they can be adjusted for as long as they are identified
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and acknowledged.109 Future training opportunities should
address ways judges can practice such self-scrutiny.
Previous research on minimizing the influence of biases
among expert witnesses has suggested employing a set of
introspective tasks as an approach to proactively detect and
prevent unconscious biases.110 Drawing on those suggestions,
similar tasks could be presented to judges as a method of rec-
ognizing threats to objectivity that may have previously been
difficult to recognize. Some of these tasks would include a list
of questions judges should ask themselves when evaluating
scientific evidence in court. For example, they could ask them-
selves if they are having difficulty assessing the quality of the
evidence, if the evidence presented resonates with preexisting
ideas or attitudes regarding a particular type of science, or if
their personal training and experience is adequate for the case. 
Limitations. There are a few limitations associated with the
current study. As with most studies that employ vignettes, the
ecological validity associated with this particular method of
data collection is limited. A short vignette is likely vague in
comparison to actual in-court testimony or more detailed dis-
coverable evidence. In regard to sample limitations, the North-
east region of the United States was underrepresented in com-
parison to other regions. Further, some judges with more
unique demographic information (e.g., jurisdiction, years
served, region) may have been reluctant to participate in the
study for fear of identifying information that could be some-
how connected to opinions and attitudes collected in the sur-
vey. All findings must be viewed cautiously in light of the
restricted range of ultimate decisional outcomes. 
Hayley J. Wechsler, M.A., is a doctoral candi-
date in clinical psychology at Sam Houston
State University. She received her master’s
degree in forensic psychology from John Jay
College of Criminal Justice. Her research inter-
ests include legal decision making, wrongful
conviction, interpersonal violence, ethics in
forensic psychology, and firearm ownership.
Robert J. Cramer, Ph.D., is currently an assis-
tant professor of criminal justice at the Univer-
sity of Alabama. Beginning in December 2015,
he will serve as an associate professor of com-
munity and environmental health at Old
Dominion University (Norfolk, VA). Dr.
Cramer’s research and training interests include
suicide; interpersonal violence; hate crimes;
LGBT identity and health; trial consulting; and the intersection of
social science, law, and policy. He has previously served as a trial
consultant with Westlake Trial Consulting (Austin, TX) and a vis-
iting scholar with the Griffith University Criminology Institute
(Brisbane, Australia).
Andre Kehn received his Ph.D. in experimental
psychology with an emphasis in psychology and
law from the University of Wyoming. He is cur-
rently an assistant professor of psychology at
the University of North Dakota. His research
interests include eyewitness memory, perception
of child witnesses, and jury decision making.
Robin E. Wosje is a currently a justice-systems
consultant where she works collaboratively
with courts and other justice professionals to
shape systems that are responsive, outcome-dri-
ven, fairer, more equitable, and more efficient.
Before serving as a consultant, Robin was a
senior program manager for the Justice Man-
agement Institute (JMI), where she led a num-
ber of projects, including documenting and analyzing criminal-
justice systems in six counties throughout the United States as part
of a larger multi-site case study, assisting the National Association
for Court Management (NACM) in the development of curricula
to support the NACM Core and teaching in the areas of evidence-
based practices, DWI Court team dynamics, and needs assess-
ments to develop training. Robin comes to JMI after working for
the National Judicial College for over twelve years. Robin was
admitted to the California State Bar in 1997 after receiving her
Juris Doctor from William Mitchell College of Law in St. Paul,
Minnesota. She also has a Bachelor of Arts in political science
and German from Hamline University in St. Paul, Minnesota.
Marcus T. Boccaccini, Ph.D., is a professor in
the Department of Psychology and Philosophy
at Sam Houston State University. His research
focuses on decision making in legal settings,
with an emphasis on understanding the factors
that influence opinions offered by expert wit-
nesses.
Jorge G. Varela is an associate professor of psy-
chology and the director of clinical training for
the doctoral program in clinical psychology at
Sam Houston State University. He earned his
doctorate at the University of Alabama and
served in the U.S. Air Force for nine years
before joining the faculty at Sam Houston State.
His primary research interests are forensic
assessment and multicultural psychology, especially the intersec-
tion of these two domains of study and practice. In addition to his
academic responsibilities, Dr. Varela is actively involved in con-
ducting adjudicative-competency assessments of Spanish-speaking
defendants and evaluating incarcerated sexual offenders being
considered for civil commitment.
Court Review - Volume 51 167
168 Court Review - Volume 51  
!
Across
1 Partially open
5 Reduce the value of
11 Status ___
14 Disney chipmunk
15 Certain vacuum cleaners
16 It might be bookmarked
17 1999 Billy Crystal/Robert De
Niro film
19 Supermarket chain, initially
20 Sal of "Exodus"
21 That woman
22 ___-deucey
23 Humorist David
26 Pancake order
28 ___ up (secured, as a win)
30 "Yes ___, Bob!"
33 Irascibility
36 Gillette's ___ Plus
38 Rods' companions
39 "___ pro nobis"
40 Synonym for words in four
other answers
42 Part of a PC command
43 Tools
46 Reed of note
47 Comic lightbulb
48 Sentence ending
50 Lefty Warren in Cooperstown
52 Prefix meaning 44-Down
54 Support frame
58 Low court score
60 Wall St. action
62 Repeated, an English pop
band
63 Follow a Vail trail
64 Memorize
67 Stein filler
68 Give proof of
69 Fairy tale's penultimate word
70 Fancy marble
71 Ride with a fulcrum
72 Attorney general before
Ashcroft
Down
1 Brewer Samuel
2 Fricke of country music
3 "___ flowing with milk and
honey"
4 Press ___
5 No. of eggs or jurors
6 Prior to, to poets
7 Sibling of Amy and Meg
8 Soreness symptoms
9 Avoids
10 Slalom shape
11 It's easily perused
12 Push vigorously
13 Big name in cosmetics
18 Olden times
22 About 44,000 square feet
24 "___ just kidding!"
25 Altercation
27 Basketball filler
29 Thrashes
31 Reese, in "Legally Blonde"
32 This, in Tampico
33 Hale-___ comet
34 "Dies ___"
35 Journal published by future
counselors
CONSIDER CLOSELY by Victor Fleming
37 Become a parent of
41 Part of a century
44 Supreme Court seat count
45 "__ of a gun!"
47 It may provide a defense
49 Part of a PC command
51 Movie star Lamarr
53 Diminish, as a nuisance
55 Cache, as of treasure
56 Approach bedtime
57 Diciembre follower
58 Future atty.'s exam
59 Tex. neighbor
61 Bonanzas' yields
64 "Viva ___ Vegas!"
65 Spy org.
66 "Incidentally," in a text
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PUBLICATIONS OF INTEREST
JENNIFER K. ELEK, ROGER K. WARREN &
PAMELA M. CASEY, USING RISK AND NEEDS
ASSESSMENT INFORMATION AT SENTENCING:
OBSERVATIONS FROM TEN JURISDICTIONS.
National Center for State Courts, 2015.
67 pp. (plus appendix). 
http://goo.gl/j0WHNr
PAMELA M. CASEY, ROGER K. WARREN &
JENNIFER K. ELEK, USING OFFENDER RISK
AND NEEDS ASSESSMENT INFORMATION AT
SENTENCING: GUIDANCE FOR COURTS FROM
A NATIONAL WORKING GROUP. National
Center for State Courts, 2011. 55 pp.
(plus online appendix). 
http://goo.gl/i9XZpr
A new report from the National Center
for State Courts shows how 10 different
jurisdictions are using risk-and-needs-
assessment information when sentencing
defendants in criminal cases. This 2015
report specifically follows up on one pub-
lished in 2011 that provided “guiding
principles” for the use of risk-and-needs
assessments in sentencing decisions. 
The new report looks to see how these
10 jurisdictions are applying the guiding
principles. For example, the first guiding
principle suggests a limited purpose for
the use of the assessment information:
“Risk and needs assessment information
should be used in the sentencing decision
to inform public safety considerations
related to offender risk reduction and
management. It should not be used as an
aggravating or mitigating factor in deter-
mining the severity of an offender’s sanc-
tion.”
The researchers report that several
jurisdictions have formally adopted limi-
tations on the use of this information,
including some that only allow it for rec-
ommending the conditions of supervi-
sion if a defendant is granted probation
and the programming that would be most
appropriate to reduce the defendant’s
chance of recidivism. They also note an
Indiana Supreme Court decision,
Malenchik v. Indiana, 928 N.E.2d 564
(Ind. 2010), in which the court said the
information could not be used as an
aggravating or mitigating factor or to
establish the length of a sentence but
could be used as a consideration in craft-
ing sentences modified for each individ-
ual defendant. 
The full report provides a wealth of
information about how risk-and-needs-
assessment information is presently
being used in courts in 10 different states.
An appendix details the practices of each
of the individual jurisdictions. 
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RECENT ARTICLES 
WORTH NOTING 
Anna Maria Barry-Jester, Ben Casselman
& Dana Goldstein, Should Prison Sen-
tences Be Based on Crimes That Haven’t
Been Committed Yet? FIVETHIRTYEIGHT.COM
(Aug. 4, 2015).
http://goo.gl/PpfQqS
For another view of the use of risk-
based needs assessments in sentencing,
take a look at this article prepared by
journalists with the website FiveThir-
tyEight.com and The Marshall Project.
The authors provide arguments for and
against the use of risk-based needs assess-
ments—all with a backdrop of recent
developments in Pennsylvania. They
include comments from Mark Bergstrom,
who has run the Sentencing Commission
in Pennsylvania for two decades, Sonja
Starr, a law professor who argues that the
use of risk assessments in sentencing is
unconstitutional, as well as a public
defender, a probation officer, a psycholo-
gist, and a statistician.  
Early in the article, the authors pro-
vide an overview of the questions critics
have raised about the use of risk-assess-
ment scores in sentencing:
The risk assessment trend is
controversial. Critics have raised
numerous questions: Is it fair to
make decisions in an individual
case based on what similar offend-
ers have done in the past? Is it
acceptable to use characteristics
that might be associated with race
or socioeconomic status, such as
the criminal record of a person’s
parents? And even if states can
resolve such philosophical ques-
tions, there are also practical ones:
What to do about unreliable data?
Which of the many available
tools—some of them licensed by
for-profit companies—should poli-
cymakers choose?
Thomas Baker et al., Shared Race/Ethnic-
ity, Court Procedural Justice, and Self-Reg-
ulating Beliefs: A Study of Female Offend-
ers, 49 LAW & SOC. REV. 433 (2015).
http://goo.gl/YEuzvS
A group of researchers reviewed data
from surveys of 554 incarcerated women
to determine the factors that might lead
to a greater feeling of obligation to obey
the law. Specifically, they sought to deter-
mine whether the relationship demon-
strated in other studies between adher-
ence to procedural-justice principles and
willingness to obey the law would hold
true for this group.
And it did. They found that female
offenders who saw the courts as more
procedurally just reported a significantly
greater obligation to obey the law.
But this study also found some new
factors that might be important—the
racial similarity or disparity between the
offender and prosecuting attorneys. For
white female inmates, those who had a
white prosecutor were significantly more
likely to perceive the courts as procedu-
rally just. Non-white female inmates per-
ceived the courts as more fair if they
encountered a minority prosecutor,
regardless of whether the prosecutor was
black or Hispanic.
Although only an abstract of the study
is available for free at the link shown
here, the ProceduralFairness.org web-
site’s blog has posted an interview with
one of the researchers, providing a
detailed review of their study and its con-
clusions.
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